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I. INTRODUCTION 
During the October 2000 Term, the Supreme Court 
delivered major setbacks for employees in Circuit City Stores, 
Inc. v. Adams,' which upheld mandatory and binding arbitra-
tion of federal and state employment discrimination claims 
through arbitration clauses forced upon employees as a 
condition of employment, and in Board of Trustees of the 
University of Alabama v. Garrett, 2 which shielded state 
employers from federal court law suits brought under the 
Americans with Disabilities Act by victims of disability 
discrimination in employment. Employees escaped harm in 
Pollard v. E.I du Pont de Nemours & Co.,3 in which the Court 
followed nearly unanimous circuit court of appeals precedent 
and rather clear statutory language in deciding that the Title 
VII front pay remedy is not subject to the limitations on 
compensatory damages (known as "caps") set forth in the 
Civil Rights Act of 1991.4 This article discusses these and 
other cases from the October 2000 Term of the Court, 
involving arbitration, attorney's fees, opposition to sexual 
harassment and ERISA preemption. 
II. MANDATORY ARBITRATION OF EMPLOYMENT CLAIMS 
Arbitration substantially occupied the time of the Court 
in the 2000 term. The Court decided five cases involving 
arbitration, three in the labor and employment law context. 
1. 121 S. Ct. 1302 (2001). 
2. 531 U.S. 356 (2001). 
3. 121 S. Ct. 1946 (2001). 
4. 42 U.S.C. §§ 198l(a)(l) & (2) (1994). 
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A fourth involved consumer arbitration law but has 
significant implications for employment arbitration.5 Two of 
the arbitration cases involved efforts to enforce arbitration 
agreements and two involved post-arbitration challenges to 
awards. The number of cases and the interest in the cases, 
as exemplified by the thirty-seven amicus briefs filed in the 
four cases, demonstrates the growing importance of 
arbitration as a dispute resolution mechanism. These 
arbitration cases followed Wright v. Universal Maritime Service 
Corp.6 in the 1998 term and Cortez Byrd Chips, Inc. v. Bi[[ 
Harbert Construction Co.' in the 1999 term. The Court has 
already granted certiorari in an arbitration case for the 2001 
term.8 Arbitration cases promise to continue to be the foc;us 
of employment litigation for the foreseeable future. 
A. The Enforcement of Arbitration Agreements 
1. Circuit City Stores v. Adams 
The most publicized, and certainly the most significant, 
arbitration case of the 2000 term was Circuit City Stores, Inc. 
v. Adams.9 Saint Clair Adams signed Circuit City's Dispute 
Resolution Agreement ("DRA") at the time he applied for 
employment. The DRA specified that it was not a contract of 
employment. Had Adams refused to execute the DRA, whicJ;t 
required binding arbitration of all employment-related 
disputes, his application would not have been considered by 
Circuit City. After several years of employment as a sales 
5. The fifth case, C & L Enterprises, Inc. v. Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian 
Tribe of Okla., 532 U.S. 411 (2001), involved the question of whether an Indian tribe 
waived sovereign immunity by agreeing in a commercial contract to arbitrate 
disputes and to permit the enforcement of arbitration awards in state court. This 
case will not be discussed in detail because of its minimal relevance to employment 
law. 6. 525 U.S. 70 {1998} {holding that union waiver of employee right to litigate 
statutory claim must be clear and unequivocal). 
7. 529 U.S. 193 (2000) (holding Federal Arbitration Act venue provisions are 
pennissive rather than mandatory). 8. EEOC v.Waffle House Inc., 193 F.3d 805 (4th Cir. 1999), cert. granted, 121 S. 
Ct. 1401 (2001). See discussion of the case infra notes 160-190 and accompanying 
text, and Editor's Note, infra note 191. 
9. 121 S. Ct. 1302 (2001). The case drew a total of eighteen amicus briefs, nine 
in support of Circuit City's position and nine in support of Adams' position. All facts 
recited herein are from the Supreme Court opinion unless otherwise noted. 
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counselor, Adams sued Circuit City in California state court. 
He alleged violations of state statutory discrimination law and 
several common law claims relating to his employment. 
Circuit City persuaded the United States District Court for 
the Northern District of California to stay Adams' state court 
action and order arbitration. 10 The Ninth Circuit Court of 
Appeals reversed, holding that the Federal Arbitration Act 
("FAA")" was not applicable to the case because the DRA was 
part of an employment contract, and the FAA excludes from 
its coverage contracts of employment." The Ninth Circuit's 
decision conflicted with those of eleven other circuits, which 
had read the FAA's exclusion for employment contracts more 
narrowly." The Ninth Circuit's holding left arbitration 
agreements in employment contracts to be enforced under 
state law, since, absent FAA coverage, no federal mechanism 
for enforcement existed outside the collective bargaining 
context. 14 
The arguments in the Supreme Court focused on the 
language and the sparse legislative history of Sections 1 and 
2 of the FAA. enacted in 1925. Section 1 contains the 
employment contract exclusion which states, "[N]othing 
herein, contained shall apply to contracts of employment of 
seamen, railroad employees, or any other class of workers 
engaged in foreign or intersta,te commerce."
15 
Section 2 
provides, in relevant part: 
A written provision in any maritime transaction or a 
contract evidencing a transaction involving commerce to 
10. 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6215. at '2 [N.D. Cal. Apr. 29, 1998). reu'd, 194 F.3d 
1070 [9th Cir. 1999), rev'd, 121 S. Ct. 1302 [2001). 
11. 9 u.s.c. §§ l ·16 [2000). 
12. 194 F.3d 1070, 1070·71 [9th Cir. 1999). reu'd, 121 S. Ct. 1302 [2001). 
13. See 121 S. Ct. at 1306-07 (citing McWilliams v. Logicon, Inc., 143 F.3d 573, 
575-576 [10th Cir. 1998): O'Neil v. Hilton Head Hosp., 115 F.3d 272, 274 [4th Cir. 
1997): Pryner v. Tractor Supply Co., 109 F.3d 354, 358 [7th Cir. 1997): Cole v. 
Burns Int'l Sec. Se:rvs.,105 F.3d 1465, 1470-1472 (D.C. Cir. 1997); Rojas v. TK 
Communications, Inc., 87 F.3d 745, 747-748 (5th Cir. 1996); Asplundh Tree Co. v. 
Bates, 71 F.3d 592, 596-601 {6th Cir. 1995); Erving v.Virginia Squires Basketball 
Club, 468 F.2d 1064, 1069 [2d Cir. 1972): Dickstein v. duPont, 443 F.2d 783, 785 
(1st Cir.1971): Tenney Eng', Inc. v. United Elec. & Machine Workers of Am., 207 F.2d 
450 [3d Cir. 1953)). 
14. In Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 451 {1957), the Supreme 
Court held that Section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act provided for 
both federal court jurisdiction and the development of federal substantive law for the 
enforcement of arbitration provisions in collective bargaining agreements. Id. at 451. 
15. 9 u.s.c. § 1 [2000). 
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settle by arbitration a controversy arising out of such 
contract or transaction . . . shall be valid, irrevocable and 
enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in 
equity for the revocation of any contract.
16 
Circuit City urged the Court to adopt the construction of 
the majority of the appellate courts that the exclusion applied 
only to contracts of transportation workers." In support of 
this interpretation, the employer cited the FAA's purpose of 
reversing judicial hostility toward enforcement of arbitration 
agreements. 1' In addition, the employer asserted two rules of 
statutory construction in support of its interpretation. First, 
the employer urged the Court not to read the statute to 
render statutory language superfluous. Had Congress 
intended to exclude all contracts of employment from the 
FAA, it could have omitted all of the statutory language after 
the word "employment."19 Second, the employer contended, 
the rule of ejusdem generis required the Court to read the 
words following "seamen" and "railroad employees" to refer to 
workers like the specified workers in kind, i.e., workers 
engaged in the transportation of people and g6ods in 
interstate commerce.2° Further, the employer urged the 
Court to read the term "engaged in ... commerce" in the 
exclusion more narrowly than "involving commerce" in the 
section describing agreements to which the statute applied.
21 
The employee, Adams, argued in support of the Ninth 
Circuit's interpretation, noting that it would make little sense 
for Congress to exclude from coverage the contracts of those 
workers over whom it clearly had commerce power, 
transportation workers, and to include other workers, over 
whom federal commerce power was far less certain in 1925.
22 
Adams also argued that employment contracts are not 
covered by Section 2 of the FAA because they are not 
"contract[s] evidencing a transaction involving interstate 
16. Id. § 2. 
17. See Circuit City Stores, Inc., Reply Brief for Petitioner, No. 99-1379, 121 S. Ct. 
1302, 1999 U.S. Briefs (Lexis) 1379, al '11 (Oct. 23, 2000). 
18. Id. 
19. Id.at*ll-12. 
20. Id. at *9-10. 
21. Id. 
22. Circuit City Stores, Inc., Brief for Respondent, No. 99-1379, 121 S. Ct. 1302, 
1999 U.S. Briefs (Lexis) 1379, at '17-18 (Sept. 19, 2000). 
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commerce" since "transactions" are commercial contracts 
only.23 In addition, he pointed out that the employment 
contract exclusion was inserted in response to the objections 
of labor to the inclusion of worker contracts. Adams asserted 
that in 1925 the term "engaged in" commerce described all 
workers within the commerce power of Congress, and rejected 
the notion that "involving" and "engaged" evidenced different 
intent.24 The other words in the exclusion, "any other class of 
workers engaged in ... commerce" also are words of breadth. 
Finally, Adams noted that since the Court had read the 
coverage of the FAA to expand as the commerce power 
expands, the exclusion should be read to expand 
correspondingly. 25 
Justice Kennedy wrote for the majority, which included 
Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices O'Connor, Scalia and 
Thomas. Justice Kennedy began by reciting the Court's 
decision in Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson"" that 
Congress intended in the FAA to assert fully its commerce 
power, and accordingly, the scope of the statute's coverage 
had expanded with the commerce power.27 He then 
addressed and rejected each of Adams' arguments. If 
employment contracts were not covered by the Section 2 term 
"transaction," the exclusion language of Section 1 would be 
unnecessary.28 Accordingl)I, the Court concluded, if all 
employment contracts are excluded, it must be by virtue of 
Sectim;i 1.29 Section 1 cannot be read broadly, however, 
because of the reference to "seamen" and "railroad 
employees," a specification that would have been unnecessary 
were all employment contracts excluded.'0 The employer's 
reliance on the canon of ejusdem generis was persuasive to 
the Court, particularly where Congress used the words 
"engaged in commerce," which the majority read as having a 
narrower reach than "involving commerce" or "affecting 
23. Id. at *19-21. 
24. Id. at '26-28. 
25. Id. at *30-31. 
26. 513 U.S. 265 (1995). 
27. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 121 S. Ct. at 1307. 
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commerce."31 Tue majority saw its reading of "engaged in" 
commerce in the FAA as consistent with its earlier 
interpretations of similar language and indicated that the 
interpretation of the language should not depend on the date 
of its incorporation in the statute.
32 
The Court concluded that the text of the statute clearly 
precluded an expansive interpretation of the exclusionary 
language, noting that its interpretation was in accord with 
the statutory purpose of overcoming judicial hostility to 
arbitration." Having found the text clear, the Court saw no 
need to resort to the legislative history.34 Nevertheless, the 
Court indicated that the legislative history was limited, and 
found Adams' reliance on testimony at subcommitttCe 
hearings untenable.35 The Court saw no anomaly in 
attributing to Congress an intent to exclude from the 
statute's coverage the employment contracts of workers over 
whom the commerce power was most certain.
36 
The Court 
indicated that a plausible explanation '.¥as · the ' existing 
arbitration prov1s10ns for seamen and the imminent 
comprehensive statute governing labor relations for railroad 
employees, which was passed the following year.
37 
Because Adams' underlying claims involved state law, a 
group of state attorneys general filed an amicus brief 
indicating their concern that adoption of Circuit City's 
position would interfere with state law and policy.
38 
In 
responding to this argument, the majority indicated that it 
was the earlier decision of Southland Corp. v. Keating,
30 
which 
was reaffirmed by Allied-Bruce,40 that required the preemption 
31. Id. at 1308-09. 
32. Id. at 1309-10. 
33. Id. at 1311. 
34. Id. 
35. Id. 
36. Id. at 1312. 37. Id. The Court explained the additional workers whose contracts were 
excluded as being part of a reservation of Congressional authority to enact specific 
provisions for those workers clearly within the commerce power. Id. 
38. Id. at 1312. Brief of the States of California. Arlzona, Arkansas, Colorado, 
Connecticut, Idaho, Illinois, Iowa, Massachusetts, Missouri, Montana, Nevada, New 
Jersey, New York, North Dakota, Pennsylvania, Vermont, Washington and West 
Virginia, as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondent, No. 99-1379, 121 S. Ct. 1302, 
1999 U.S. Briefs (Lexis) 1379, at '4 (Sept. 19, 2000). 
39. 465 U.S. 1 (1984). 
40. 513 U.S. at 272. 
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of state law. The Court reiterated the value of arbitration and 
its desire not to frustrate employment arbitration by leaving 
the enforcement to state law, which would cause unnecessary 
complications for the parties." 
Justices Souter and Stevens authored dissents. Justice 
Souter's dissent, joined by Justices Stevens, Ginsburg and 
Breyer, read the Section 1 exclusion's use of the term 
"engaged in" commerce as extending to the limits of Congress' 
commerce power in 1925.42 Since the Court in Allied Bruce 
read Section 2 as evolving with time to encompass the 
current extent of the commerce power, the Section 1 
exclusion should be read similarly." In addition, unlike the 
majority, Justice Souter had no problem relying for support 
on Commerce Secretary Hoover's testimony at the subcom-
mittee hearing, where he suggested the exclusionary 
language of Section 1 to meet labor's objections to the 
inclusion of workers' contracts in the statute." Justice 
Souter declined to rely on the canon of ejusdem generis, 
noting that the majority was using the canon to reject 
legislative history, rather than to interpret the statute where 
the language and legislative history are unclear.45 The 
dissenting opinion agreed with Adams that it would be 
anomalous for Congress to exclude the very workers over 
whom it clearly had power, wnile including those for whom its 
power was questionable.46 Although Justice Souter agreed 
with the majority that Congress may have specifically 
mentioned "seamen" and "railroad workers" because of 
specific legislation directed at them, he read these references 
as affirming that Congress did not intend to affect existing 
legislation, rather than limiting the exclusion.47 
41. 121 S. Ct. at 1313. Subsequent to the decision, the Court granted certiorari, 
vacated the judgment and remanded to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals three 
other cases involving Circuit City's arbitration agreement. Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. 
Ahmed, 121 S. Ct. 1399 (2001); Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Ingle, 121 S. Ct. 1399 
(2001): Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Al-Safm, 121 S. Ct. 1399 {2001). 
42. 121 S. Ct. at 1320 {Souter, J., dissenting). 
43. Id. at 1319-20 (Souter, J., dissenting) {citing Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. 
Dobson, 513 U.S. 265 (1995)). 
44. Id. at 1320, 1322 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
45. Id. at 1322 n.2 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
46. Id. at 1321-22 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
47. Id. at 1322 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
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Justice Stevens' dissent was joined fully by Justices 
Breyer and Ginsburg and in part by Justice Souter.'" Justice 
Stevens discussed the legislative history of the bill more 
extensively than the majority, noting that although nothing in 
the bill indicated that it would apply to anything other than 
commercial and admiralty contracts, the bill drew objections 
from organized labor groups concerned about its use to 
enforce employment agreements and collectively bargained 
contracts.49 Supporters of the bill, including the chair of the 
ABA committee that drafted the legislation and Secretary of 
Commerce Hoover, indicated that it was not intended to apply 
to such contracts, but suggested the language that later 
became Section 1 to confirm the intent.'0 Justice Stevens 
found nothing surprising in Congress' adoption of language, 
perhaps unnecessary, to respond to the concerns of a bill's 
51 ' 
opponents. . 
Justice Stevens further noted that in the early years after 
passage of the statute, courts routinely found that collective 
bargaining agreements were excluded from the Act.'
2 
Not 
until 1953 did the first court decide that only contracts of 
transportation workers were excluded.
53 
In 1957, the Court decided Textile Workers v. Lincoln 
Mills," in which the union urged the Court to interpret the 
FAA's exclusion as applying only to transportation workers 
and to order the employer to arbitrate pursuant to a collective 
bargaining agreement. Instead of reading the FAA as the 
majority did in Circuit City, the Textile Workers Court 
interpreted Section 301 of the Labor-Management Relations 
Act, which never mentions arbitration, to provide a cause of 
action for enforcement of arbitration agreements in collective 
bargaining contracts.55 Justice Stevens read Textile Workers 
as supportive of Adams' interpretation of the exclusion.
56 
48. Justice Souter did not join the portion of the opinion discussing the 
legislative history. Id. at 1314. 
49. Id. at 1315 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
50. Id. {Stevens, J., dissenting). 
51. Id. at 1316 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
52. Id. at 1316-17 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
53. Id. at 1317 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
54. 353 U.S. 448 (1957). 
55. Id. at 451. 
56. 121 S. Ct. at 1317 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
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Finally, Justice Stevens viewed the majority's decision as 
permitting a policy preference for arbitration, developed long 
after enactment of the FAA, to deny the correct reading of the 
statute. To Justice Stevens, the exclusion clearly was 
motivated by the expressed concerns at the time that 
inclusion of workers' contracts would permit powerful 
employers to require powerless employees to accept 
unfavorable agreements, which would then be enforceable by 
the courts.57 
The significance of the Circuit City decision cannot be 
overestimated. Numerous employers have adopted policies 
requiring their employees to arbitrate all employment 
disputes, and attorneys representing employers are already 
reporting a significant increase in the number of clients 
requesting development of arbitration agreements for their 
employees. These arbitration policies cover state and federal 
statutory and common law claims as well as contractual 
claims. Although some policies allow the employee to choose 
whether to agree to arbitration, most require agreement to 
arbitration as a condition of employment. The FAA now 
clearly provides an enforcement mechanism for such arbitra-
tion agreements, except in the transportation industry." 
Had the Court read the FAA to exclude most employment 
contracts, the enforcement. of arbitration agreements would 
have' been left to state law. The variations and uncertainties 
created would have led to years of litigation over 
enforceability and might well have caused many employers to 
abandon efforts to require arbitration. Alternatively, such a 
decision might have spurred Congress to legislate more 
57. Id. at .1318 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
58. The decision does not delineate the precise scope of the exclusion. It might 
be read to exclude only contracts of employees actually engaged in the movement of 
goods or people in interstate commerce. See id. at 1307 (noting the interpretation of 
most courts of appeals). Alternatively, it might exclude all contracts of employment 
with employees of employers engaged in transportation. See id. at 1312 (referencing 
legislation relating to air lines and their employees}. Under the former reading, a 
contract with a truck driver for a manufacturing company would be excluded while a 
contract with a janitor for an airline would not, while under the latter reading the 
opposite result would be reached. The transportation industry remains heavily 
unionized, see Cynthia Engel, Competition Drives the Trucking Industry, 124 MONTHLY 
LAB. REV., Apr. 1998, at 34, 37, and collective bargaining agreement arbitration 
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as substantial 
enforceability of directly about employment arbitration, questions would have been raised over the 
arbitration of federal claims under state law. 
A contrary decision also would have required the courts 
to determine what constitutes an employment contract, 
because the FAA's exclusion refers to contracts of 
employment. While the Ninth Circuit found that Circuit 
City's arbitration agreement was part of a contract of 
employment, the agreement itself disclaimed any contractual 
status.59 The Court did not have to reach the issue of whether 
the agreement was, in fact, a contract. In Gilmer v. 
Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp.,60 the Court declined to reach 
the issue of the applicability of the FAA employment contract 
exclusion because the agreement to arbitrate was contairied 
in a securities industry registration application.6
1 
Employers 
that desired to retain arbitration systems li\;:ely would have 
attempted to impose arbitration requirements in formats 
similar to that of the securities industry to avoid the FAA 
exclusion. 
Since the decision favored enforceability, however, the 
focus of future litigation is likely to be on the fairness of 
arbitration agreements.62 The Court's decision in Green Tree 
Financial Corp. v. Rando[ph,63 suggests that an arbitration 
agreement that precludes a plaintiff from effectively 
vindicating statutory rights will not be enforced.
64 
Employees 
seeking to avoid arbitration of statutory claims will likely 
59. Circuit City, Inc., 194 F.3d at 1071. 
60. 500 U.S. 20 (1991). 61. Id. at 25 n.2 (1991). The issue also was neither raised in the courts below 
nor encompassed by the petition for certiorari. Id. 
62. Prior to Circuit City, the Ninth Circuit was the only circuit to hold that 
employees cannot be required to waive their right to litigate future Title VII claims. 
Duffield v. Robertson Stephens & Co., 144 F.Sd 1182 (9th Cir. 1998). Several 
California district courts have read Circuit City as overruling Duffield. See Rooz 
Abras Eftekhari v. Peregrine Fin. & Secs., 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16087, at *25 {N.D. 
Cal. Sept. 24, 2001) (fmding that Circuit City requires plaintiff to arbitrate Title VII 
claims): Olivares v. Hispanic Broad. Corp. 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5760, at *1-2 {C.D. 
Cal. Apr. 26, 2001) ( finding that Circuit City requires plaintiff to arbitrate claims 
under California discrimination statutes). Other district courts have disagreed. See, 
e.g., Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Banyasz, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16953 at *7 {N.D. 
Cal. Oct. 11, 2001). 
63. 531 U.S. 79 (2000). 64. Id. at 88-89. For discussion of Green Tree, see infra notes 76-101 and 
accompanying text. 
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argue that arbitration schemes do not meet this requirement. 
The amicus brief filed by a number of employee advocacy 
organizations in Circuit City sets forth a series of issues that 
may affect the fairness of arbitration including: 1) lack of 
voluntary and knowing waivers of their rights by employees; 
2) large fees to arbitrate statutory claims which would not be 
necessary for judicial enforcement of statutory rights; 3) 
limits on relief which prohibit employees from receiving 
remedies that would be available in litigation; and 4) unfair 
procedures, including shortened statutes of limitations, 
discovery restrictions, non-neutral arbitrators, employer free-
dom to change procedures without notice, and unwritten de-
cisions."' Similarly the D. C. Circuit, in Cole v. Bums Interna-
tional Security Services,66 and the California Supreme Court, 
in Annendariz v. Foundation Health Psychcare Services, 
67 
have 
suggested the elements of a fair arbitration procedure for 
mandatory employment arbitration. Those elements include: 
"(l) a neutral arbitrator; (2) more than minimal discovery; (3) 
a written award; (4) full statutory remedies that would 
otherwise be available in court; and (5) no burden on the 
employee to pay either unreasonable costs or any arbitrators' 
fees or expenses."68 
Other related avenues for challenging arbitration exist. 
For example, where an ei;nployer imposes an arbitration 
agreement unilaterally in an employee handbook, particularly 
one that asserts that nothing in the handbook creates a 
contract. the employee might argue that no agreement to 
65. Circuit City Stores, Inc., Brief of Amici Curiae Lawyers' Committee for Civil 
Rights Under Law; NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Inc.; National 
Association for the Advancement of Colored People; Mexican American Legal Defense 
and Educational Fund; National Partnership for Women & Families; National 
Women's Law Center; and NOW Legal Defense and Education Fund in Support of 
Respondent,, No. 99-1379, 121 S. Ct. 1302, 1999 U.S. Briefs {Lexis) 1379, at *13-27 
{Sept. 19, 2000). One commentator has suggested that where remedies have been 
limited in arbitration and the arbitration results in a victory for the employee, the 
damages issue might be the subject of a judicial action subsequent to arbitration. 
David S. Schwartz, Short-Circuiting Employee Rights: Compelled Arbitration after 
Circuit City 18-19 (2001) (manuscript on file with the authors). 
66. 105 F.3d 1465 (1997). Cole was authored by Judge Harry Edwards, who was 
a well respected labor lawyer and law professor before taking the bench. 
67. 6 P.3d 699 (Cal. 2000). 
68. Cole, 105 F.3d at 1482. See also Armendariz, 6 P.3d at 681-90 (relying on 
the Cole requirements). 
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arbitrate exists.69 Additionally. where an agreement lacks 
mutuality of obligation. arbitration may not be ordered.
70 
Finally, the arbitration agreement must incorporate the 
claims that the employer seeks to compel the employee to 
arbitrate." To date, some lower courts have refused to 
enforce or have modified arbitration agreements based on one 
or more of the above enumerated defects, while others have 
declined to do so, permitting arbitration to proceed despite 
such provisions.72 Employers desirous of enforcing arbitration 
agreements without litigation should draft them so that 
arbitration is as close as possible to the Gilmer Court's 
description of an alternative forum which forgoes no 
procedural or substantive rights of the employee.'.' 
A bill designed to reverse the Circuit City decision was 
introduced into Congress in June. The Preservation of Civil 
Rights Protections Act would amend the Federal Arbitration 
Act so that the only enforceable employment arbitration 
agreements are those voluntarily agreed to by both the 
employer and the employee after a dispute arises.
74 
While 
similar legislation has been introduced in each Congress 
since 1994 without enactment, the Circuit Cily ruling may 
69. Schwartz. supra note 65, at 12-13 {citing inter alia Ramirez de Arellano v. 
American Airlines, 133 F.3d 89 {lst Cir. 1997)). 70. Id. at 13-15 (citing inter alia Floss v. Ryan's Family Steak Houses, 211 F.3d 
306 (6th Cir. 2000)). 
71. Id. at 29-30. 72. Compare Cole, 105 F.3d at 1482 (Interpreting arbitration agreement to 
require employer to pay all fees) and Paladino v. Avnet Computer Tech., Inc,, 134 
F.3d 1054, 1060, 1062 (11th Cir. 1998) (refusing to require arbitration where large 
fees imposed on employee, and Title VII damages not available) with Rosenberg v. 
Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 170 F.3d 1. 16 (1st Cir. 1999) (fee-splltting 
provision did not affect enforceability of arbitration agreement). Compare Gannon v. 
Circuit City Stores, Inc., 262 F.3d 677 (8th Cir. 2001) (severing provision limiting 
punitive damages while enforcing agreement to arbitrate) with Perez v. Globe Airport 
Sec. Serv., Inc., 253 F.3d 1280 (11th Cir. 2001) (refusing to enforce arbitration 
agreement which required employee to waive fees and costs that were statutorily 
available in Title VII action). Compare Leonard v. Clear Channel Communications, 
1997 WL 581439, at '4 (W.D. Tenn. July 23. 1997) (enforcing unsigned arbitration 
agreement contained in employment manual) with Prudential Ins. Co. v. Lai, 42 F.3d 
1299, 1304-05 (9th Cir. 1994) (refusing to enforce agreement where employee 
consent was not knowing and voluntary). See also Hooters of Am. v. Phillips, 173 
F.3d 933, 935 (4th Cir. 1999) (invalidating arbitration agreement because of 
unfairness, including exclusive employer control over procedures which the court 
described as "utterly lacking in the rudiments of even-handedness"). 
73. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 26, 30-33. 74. R.R. 2282, 107th Cong. (2001). The bill also permits enforcement of collective 
bargaining agreen1ents. Id. at§ 3(b)(2). 
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spur civil rights groups to increase the pressure on Congress 
to limit mandatory employment arbitration.
75 
2. Green Tree Financial Corp. v. Randolph
76 
Although Green Tree is a consumer case. it has 
significant implications for employment arbitration. Randolph 
sued Green Tree. through which she financed the purchase of 
her mobile home, for violating the Truth in Lending Act. The 
district court dismissed her claim on the basis of the 
arbitration agreement in the financing contract, and denied 
her request for certification of a class." After concluding that 
the dismissal was a final order providing appellate 
jurisdiction, the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit 
reversed, finding that the arbitration agreement did not 
provide minimum guarantees that Randolph could vindicate 
her statutory rights through arbitration, since the agreement 
did not specify the amount and allocation of the arbitral 
costs.78 The Supreme Court faced two issues: the 
appealability of the lower court's decision under the FAA, and 
the enforceability of the arbitration agreement. 
All the justices agreed that an order dismissing all claims 
and ordering arbitration is a final order under Section 16(a)(3) 
of the FAA.79 The longstanding interpretation of "final 
decision" convinced the court to permit an appeal, although a 
number of courts of appeal had declined to permit an appeal 
where an .order compelling arbitration was entered in an 
"embedded proceeding," i.e., one that "involved both a request 
for arbitration and other claims for relief."
80 
On the substantive issue, however, the justices dis-
agreed, with the same five member majority as in Circuit City 
voting to reverse the decision of the Eleventh Circuit denying 
75. See House Democrats Introduce Legislation to Overturn High Court's Circuit 
City Ruling, 17 IND. EMP. Rrs. [BNA), July 10, 2001, at 53. 
76. 531 U.S. 79 [2000). 
77. 991 F. Supp. 1410 [M.D. Ala. 1998). rev'd, 178 F.3d 1149 [11th Cir. 1999). 
affdinpart. rev'dinpart, 531U.S.79 [2000). 
78. 178 F.3d 1149 [11th Cir. 1999), affd in part, rev'd in part, 531 U.S. 79 
[2000). 79. 531 U.S. at 86, (citing 9 U.S.C. §16(a){3) (stating that "an appeal may be 
taken from ... a final decision with respect to an arbitration that is subject to this 
title.")). 
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arbitration. The majority, in an opinion authored by Chief 
Justice Rehnquist, concluded that although the plaintiff 
argued that she did not have the resources to arbitrate, she 
did not meet her burden of establishing that the costs of 
arbitration would be prohibitive." The record was silent 
concerning the amount and allocation of arbitral costs.B
2 
Randolph argued that the silence in the arbitration 
agreement created a risk that she would be subjected to 
prohibitive costs which would cause her to abandon her 
claim 83 (which was worth approximately·$15.00 per year to 
her and each of the other potential class members).
84 
The 
Court recognized that the costs of arbitration might be so 
great that they could inlpermissibly interfere with a 
consumer's statutory right to vindicate her claim.B' But the 
Court placed the burden of demonstrating such costs on 
Randolph, the consumer, and found that she had not met 
that burden.BB According to the Court, to hold otherwise 
would interfere with the policy favoring arbitration.
87 
Since 
Randolph made no showing regarding costs, the Court did 
not specify what sort of evidence might be sufficient to meet 
the burden.BB 
Justice Ginsburg's partial dissent argued that the Court 
should remand for consideration of whether the arbitral 
forum was accessible to the plaintiff.89 She drew a distinction 
between the adequacy of the arbitral forum and its 
accessibility, asserting that prior decisions specified that the 
party objecting to arbitration bears the burden of showing its 
inadequacy, but not necessarily the inaccessibility.9° Justice 
Ginsburg noted that Green Tree, a repeat player in 
arbitration, drafted the contract, and therefore could have 
81. Id. at 90-91. 82. Id. Randolph submitted limited evidence with respect to average arbitration 
fees of the American Arbitriltion Association, but the majority found such evidence 
plainly insufficient. Id. at 91 n.6. 
83. Id. at 90. 
84. 991 F. Supp. at 1415. 
85. 531 U.S. at 90. 
86. Id. at 91-92. 
87. Id.at91. 
88. Id. at 92. 
89. Id. at 93 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
90. Id. at 93-94 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). Justice Breyer did not join Section II 
of the dissent which discusses inadequacy and inaccessibility. Id. at 92. 
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specified both the amount and allocation of costs.
91 
Accordingly, it was not clear that the consumer should bear 
the burden of showing inaccessibility, but rather than 
deciding the question, Justice Ginsburg would have 
remanded for evidence of Green Tree's practice regarding 
fees.92 Justice Ginsburg read the majority opinion as 
permitting Randolph to return to court after arbitration with 
any complaint about cost allocation, noting that the question 
then was only the timing of the determination as to whether 
the costs were excessive.93 Accordingly, a remand would be 
appropriate. The majority did not reach the question of 
whether · arbitral preclusion of class actions barred 
enforcement of the arbitration clause because the Eleventh 
Circuit did not decide that issue, but the dissent read the 
Court's opinion to permit consideration of that issue by the 
Eleventh Circuit." 
Because Green n-ee was decided under the FAA, its 
holding is equally applicable to employment arbitration. The 
recognition that an arbitration provision might be so costly to 
plaintiffs that the agreement would be unenforceable as an 
impermissible intrusion on statutory rights provides promise 
for future challenges to arbitration agreements. But the 
Court's willingness to enforce an agreement to arbitrate 
which is silent on the issue creates difficulties for plaintiffs 
malting such challenges. The plaintiff must file a legal action 
and initiate discovery to determine costs, without any 
guidanc.e from the Court as to what constitutes a sufficient 
showing of excessive cost. Alternatively, the plaintiff must 
arbitrate and challenge the costs subsequently. The available 
remedy at that point, however, would seem to be nothing 
more than financial reimbursement for the costs, rather than 
the availability of a judicial action. 
While the Court did not reach the class action issue, it 
promises to resurface in the Court, either in Green n-ee or 
91. Id. at 95-96 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
92. Id. at 96 {Ginsburg, J., dissenting). The dissent noted that there are a 
number of arbitration programs that provide low cost arbitration to consumers and 
suggested that Green Tree could have specified that arbitration would be conducted 
under such a program. Id. at 95 & n.2. 
93. Id. at 97 {Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
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another case. Since many consumer cases and some 
employment cases are financially feasible only if brought on a 
class basis, the preclusion of class actions by arbitration may 
prevent or deter statutory enforcement.95 Lower courts have 
split on the issue of whether to compel arbitration in cases 
filed as class actions.96 Some courts have had no difficulty 
ordering arbitration in class action cases despite the protests 
of plaintiffs concerned about deprivation of their right to 
proceed as a class.97 In some cases, the courts assumed that 
the class claims could be arbitrated, while in others the issue 
of whether the arbitration would proceed on ·a class or 
individual basis was not addressed.98 Other courts have 
declined to order arbitration in class cases, citing concern 
about the impact on class claims and the ability to obtain 
effective relief, particularly where individual claims are 
small.99 At least one arbitration provider markets its rules on 
the basis that they ptohibit class actions.'°0 Since some 
companies desiring to avoid class claims seek to preclude 
them using arbitration agreements, 10' the Court eventually 
will have to determine whether such agreements are 
enforceable to prevent class litigation and instead compel 
individual arbitration. In addition, courts, and perhaps 
eventually the Supreme Court, must determine whether a 
class action can proceed in either litigation or arbitration 
where the arbitration agreement is silent on the class issue. 
These decisions, regardless of the underlying area of law 
involved, will have substantial impact on employment law 
and litigation. 
95. For a thorough and detailed analysis of class actions and arbitration, see 
Jean Stemlight, As Mandatory Binding Arbitration Meets the Cl.ass Action, Will the 
Cl.ass Action Survive?, 42 WM. & MARYL. REV .1 (2000). 
96. Id. at 19. 57-62 and cases cited therein. 
97. Id. at 60-61 & nn.219-224. 
98. Id. at 61-62, 65 and cases cited therein. An arbitration agreement may or 
may not address the question of whether class claims can be arbitrated. Id. at 67. 
99. Id. at 58-59 and cases cited therein. 
100. Id. at 72 ("The National Arbitration Forum has marketed its rules to 
corporations in part with the assurance that its rules do not allow for class 
actions."). 
101. Id. at 5-10. 
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B. The Scope of Judicial Review of Arbitration Awards 
Two arbitration cases. involved challenges to awards by 
the losing party, which asked the court to set aside the 
decision on public policy grounds in one case and on the 
ground that the arbitrator exceeded his authority under the 
agreement in the other. While both of these challenges arose 
in the labor context, each promises to affect judicial review of 
employment arbitration awards. 
1. Eastern Associated Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers of 
America102 
Labor arbitration awards under collective bargaining 
agreements are enforceable under Section 301 of the Labor-
Management Relations Act. 103 In 1960, the Supreme Court 
held that collectively bargained arbitration agreements would 
be read with a presumption in favor of arbitrability, as labor 
arbitration is a substitute, not for litigation, but for industrial 
strife. 104 In addition, the Court held that judicial review of 
awards was limited for the same reason. 105 The Court has 
held, however, that courts can set aside awards that violate 
"well-defined" and "dominant" public policies "ascertained 'by 
reference to the laws and legal precedents and not from 
general considerations of supposed public interests.""
00 
Litigation on public policy issues has often focused on 
arbitral reinstatement of employees who commit acts that 
could be classified as unlawful or immoral.
107 
· Eastern Associated Coal is a typical case. The arbitrator 
reinstated a truck driver who had twice tested positive for 
marijuana, subject to a three month suspension, payment of 
the arbitration costs, continued participation in a substance 
102. 531 U.S. 57 (2000). 
103. 29 U.S.C. §185 {1994); see Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 
448, 451 (1957). 
104. United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564, 566 (1960). 
105. United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Co., 363 U.S. 593, 596 
(1960). 
106. W.R. Grace & Co. v. Rubber Workers, 461 U.S. 757, 766 (1983), (quoting 
Muschany v. United States, 324 U.S. 49, 66 (1945)). 
107. For a review of the case law, see Ann C. Hodges, Judicial Review of 
Arbitration Awards on Public Policy Grounds: Lessons from the Case Law. 16 OHIO ST. 
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abuse program, continued random testing, and a signed, 
undated letter of resignation which took effect if the employee 
tested positive within the following five years.'
0
' The 
employer, citing the Omnibus Transportation Employee 
Testing Act of 1991 109 and the implementing Department of 
Transportation regulations, 110 asked the court to vacate the 
award on public policy grounds.rn The d~strict court, while 
recognizing a public policy against performance of safety 
sensitive jobs by employees using drugs, found that the 
award did not violate the policy.112 The Fourth Circuit Court 
of Appeals affirmed the decision in an unpublished opinion.
113 
The Supreme Court unanimously affirmed the Fourth Circuit, 
with Justice Breyer writing the opinion, and Justice Sea.Lia 
filing a concurring opinion joined by Justice Thomas. 
The decision reaffirmed the very narrow scope of the 
public policy exception, but refrained from limiting it to 
situations where the awatd itself either violated positive law 
or required one of the parties to do so. 114 The Court carefully 
examined the Onmibus Transportation Employee Testing Act 
and ascertained several relevant public policies, including a 
policy against drug use by employees in safety sensitive 
positions and a policy in favor of drug testing. 
115 
The Court 
also found in the Testing Act a policy in favor of rehabilitation 
of drug users, and further cited the policy supporting 
determination of disciplinary issues by arbitration where a 
collective bargaining agreement so provides.
110 
The Court concluded that the policies were not violated 
by the award, since it punished the driver, required treatment 
and testing, and made clear that he would be terminated 
upon another positive test. 117 The Testing Act does not 
108. 531 U.S. 57 (2000). 109. Pub. L. No. 102-143, Title V. 105 Stat. 917. 952-65 (1991) (codified at 49 
u.s.c. §§ 31306, 31310 (1994)). 
110. See 49 C.F.R. pt. 382 (2001). 
111. 531 U.S. at63. 112. 66 F. Supp. 2d 796. 805 (S.D. W. Va. 1998), ajfd mem.. 188 F.3d 501 (4tb 
Cir. 1999), ajfd, 531 U.S. 57 (2000). 
113. 188 F.3d 501 (4tb Cir. 1999) (unpublished table decision), a.ffd, 531 U.S. 57 
(2000). 
114. 531 U.S. at 63. 
115. Id. 
116. Id. at 64. 
117. Id. at 66. 
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require termination of employees who test positive, but leaves 
the determination of employment penalty to employers, 
subject to their collective bargaining agreements. 118 Nor does 
the Act or its regulations specify any particular penalty for 
recidivists; indeed the Department of Transportation 
considered but rejected a regulation that would have imposed 
a sixty day driving suspension for two failed drug tests.
11
" 
Accordingly, the Court rebuffed the employer's public policy 
claim. The concurrence criticized the majority for failing to limit 
the public policy exception to cases where the award violated 
or required a party to violate positive law. Justice Scalia 
suggested that the Court inappropriately left the door open 
for public policy arguments where the award does not violate 
positive law, even though the narrow reading of the exception 
by the Court left little room for an award that would violate 
public policy without violating positive law."
0 
Accordingly, in 
Justice Scalia's view, leaving open the possibility did nothing 
more than create confusion and uncertainty.
121 
This is the second time that the Court has granted 
certiorari in a public policy case raising the scope of the 
exception. In the first case, the Court did not decide whether 
to limit the exception to circumstances where the award 
violates positive law; 122 in the instant case the Court agreed 
"in principle" that the exception is not so limited, but as 
Justice Scalia noted, the Court's analysis indicates that 
awards tliat do not violate positive law will rarely, if ever, be 
overturned for public policy reasons. 123 Nevertheless, the 
·Court's failure to close the door on such cases insures that 
employers will continue to assert that reinstatement of 
employees by arbitrators violates public policy in cases 
involving drugs, alcohol, sexual harassment and similar 
118. Id. at 65. The rules did require removal from the safety sensitive position 
and completion of drug treatment before return to work. Id. at 64. 
119. Id. at 66. 
120. Id. at 68 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
121. Id. Justice Scalia's opinion also argues against applying the exception in 
cases where there is no violation of positive law, indicating that the courts should 
not act in such circumstances where the legislature has failed to do so. Id. 
122. See United PapeIWorkers Int'l Union v. Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. 29, 45 n.12 
(1987). 
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behavior. Public safety will be invoked to challenge the 
finality of arbitration awards with little gained other than 
enforcement delay. Some courts have applied the public policy exception in 
employment arbitration cases.""' As employment arbitration 
increases and more employees obtain favorable reinstatement 
awards, public policy challenges in the employment 
arbitration context may grow as well. 12' The narrow standard 
of review should apply equally in the employment context, 
given the deferential posture of the courts in employment 
arbitration.126 
2. Major League Baseball Players Association v. Garvey
12
' 
The Garvey case also arose out of a collective bargaining 
agreement and thus, the action for judicial review was 
brought under Section 301.128 The interesting factual 
scenario, however, gives '·rise to speculation that it may 
indicate the Court's inclinations in arbitration cases outside 
the labor context. Garvey was an unsigned per curiam 
opinion, decided without briefing or argument, with a short 
concurrence by Justice Ginsburg and a dissent by Justice 
Stevens. Garvey arose out of a series of grievances filed. by the 
Major League Baseball Players Association against the Major 
League Baseball Clubs, alleging that the Clubs had colluded 
in the market for free agents in the mid-1980s.
12
' After the 
initial arbitrators found collusion, the Clubs and the 
124. See, e.g., PaineWebber, Inc. v. Agron, 49 F.3d 347, 351-52 (8th Cir. 1995) 
(involving contractual just cause provision); Collins v. Blue Cross Blue Shield, 916 F. 
Supp. 638, 643-44 (E.D. Mich. 1995) (involving statutory discrimination claims), 
vacated on other grounds, 103 F.3d 35 (6th Cir. 1996). See also Stephen L. Hayford, 
Law in Disarray: Judicial Standards for Vacatur of Commercial Arbitration Awards, 30 
GA. L. REV. 731, 764 (1996) (noting use of public policy as ground for vacatur of 
commercial awards by courts of appeal). 125. While there are grounds for public policy arguments in cases other than 
those reinstating employees who have allegedly engaged in improper behavior, the 
oveJWhelming majority of the labor cases raising the issue have been discharge 
cases. Hodges, supra note 107, at 95-96. 126. For further discussion of the application of the public policy standard in the 
employment arbitration context, see Hodges, supra note 107, at 145-55. 
127. 532 U.S. 504 (2001). 
128. See id. at 509. 
129. Id. at 505. 
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Association negotiated a settlement agreement which 
established a fund for players injured by the collusion. 130 The 
Association created a "Framework" for evaluation of players' 
claims of damage, which provided that players could obtain 
arbitral review of the fund distribution plan. m The 
arbitrator's authority was to determine "'only whether the 
approved Framework and the criteria set forth therein have 
been properly applied in the proposed Distribution Plan.'" 132 
Garvey sought arbitration after his claim for damages was 
rejected by the Association under the Framework.133 The 
arbitrator denied Garvey's claim, indicating doubt as to the 
credibility of the evidence that he offered in support of his 
claim. 134 The arbitrator stated that the evidence supporting 
the claim, a letter from the San Diego Padres' president and 
CEO, contradicted the same individual's testimony in the 
earlier arbitration on collusion, and for that reason he 
rejected the letter. 135 
Although the district court denied Garvey's motion to 
vacate the award, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals 
reversed. 136 The Ninth Circuit decided that the arbitrator 
'"dispense[d] his own brand of industrial justice"' because the 
arbitrator refused to credit Garvey's evidence based on its 
conflict with prior testimony that a panel of arbitrators, 
chaired by the arbitrator w.ho decided Garvey's case, had 
decided was false. 137 Thus, the Ninth Circuit thought the 
arbitrator's failure to credit the subsequent testimony was 
"inexplicable" and almost "irrational."138 The Ninth Circuit 
remanded to the district court to vacate the award, 139 and the 
district court remanded to the arbitrator for further 
hearing. 140 Garvey again appealed and the Ninth Circuit, in 
130. Id. at 506. 
131. Id. 
132. Id. [quoting Garvey v. Roberts, 203 F.3d 580, 583 (9th Cir. 2000)). 
133. Id. 
134. Id. 
135. Id. at 507. 
136. 203 F.3d 580, 589 [9th Cir. 2000). 
137. Id. at 588 (quoting United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 
U.S. 593, 597 (1960)). 
138. Id. at 590. 
139. Id. at 592. 
140. Garvey v. Major League Baseball Players Ass'n, 167 L.R.RM. (BNA) 2132 
(C.D. Cal. 2000). 
\ 
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an unpublished decision, stated that its previous decision 
had established that the only decision the arbitrator could 
make on the evidence was that Ganley was entitled to 
damages. 141 Accordingly, the court ordered the district court 
to remand the case to the arbitrator with instructions to issue 
an award in favor of Garvey."2 On this unusual set of facts, 
the Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed. 
The opinion began by reiterating the narrow scope of 
judicial review, which eschews review on the merits and looks 
only to whether the arbitrator is arguably applying the 
contract and acting within the scope · of contractual 
authority. 143 Arbitral error, regardless of the severity, does 
not justify overturning the decision. 144 Because the Ninth 
Circuit set aside the award based on its disagreement with 
the arbitrator's factual findings on credibility,. the Court 
reversed. 145 The Court went on to state that even where a 
court properly overturns .. an award on procedural or 
substantive grounds. the Court should remand to the 
arbitrator rather than decide the dispute itself.
14
' While the 
latter statement is dicta, since the Court found no grounds 
for overturning the award, it reflects the current view of the 
Court, which is quite deferential to arbitral authority. The 
Court did suggest, however, that a decision could be so 
irrational as to warrant vacatur on grounds that it was not 
within the arbitrator's authority under the agreement. 
147 
Justice Ginsburg concurred, briefly indicating that she 
agreed that the Ninth Circuit should not have set aside the 
award and that nothing more needed to be said.
148 
Justice 
Stevens wrote a longer dissent. Justice Stevens suggested 
141. 243 F.3d 547 (9th Cir. 2000) (unpublished table decision}, available at 2000 
U.S. App. Lexis 31918, '3. rev'd, 532 U.S. 504 (2001). · 
142. Id. at *5. 
143. 532 U.S. at 509. 
144. Id. at 510. 
145. Id. at. 510-11. The Court also indicated that it did not fmd any serious error 
in the award, much less inexplicable or irrational error. Id. at 511 n.2. 
146. Id. at 511. 
14 7. Id. Specifically, the Court said: "If a remand is appropriate even when the 
arbitrator's award has been set aside for 'procedural aberrations' that constitute 
'affirmative misconduct,' it follows that a remand ordinarily will be appropriate when 
the arbitrator simply made factual findings that the reviewing court perceives as 
'irrational.'" Id. 
148. Id. at 512 (Ginsburg, J., concurring). 
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that while the test for judicial review is settled, the cases 
provide little guidance regarding the standards to be used to 
detennine when arbitrators exceed their authority.
149 
Thus, 
he would have preferred to hear the case after briefing and 
argument, particularly where the Court reached out 
unnecessarily to decide the matter of remedy."
0 
In its 
present posture, however, Justice Stevens could not agree 
with the Court's decision. He noted further that it was 
unclear whether the majority held that a court may never 
overturn a decision based on a factual error, or whether the 
error in the instant case was insufficient to warrant rejection 
of the award."1 If it is the latter, in Justice Stevens' view, the 
Court failed to explain its standards or reasoning.
152 
As in Eastern Associated Coal, the Court emphasized the 
narrow scope for judicial review. Although the Court treated 
Garvey as a labor case under Section 301, the arbitrator's 
decision was actually far removed from interpreting the 
collective bargaining agreement. The arbitrator was 
interpreting a Framework established by the union for 
allocating a settlement fund which resulted from an 
arbitration that interpreted the collective bargaining 
agreement. Thus, arbitral expertise in interpreting collective 
bargaining agreements, a significant part of the rationale for 
the judicial deference to the . arbitrator mandated in the 
Steelworkers Trilogy, 153 played no role in the case before the 
Court. Given the absence of such rationale, the decision may 
signal that the Court will give substantial deference to 
· arbitral decisions in employment matters where the arbitrator 
is interpreting an individual employment contract, an 
employee handbook, or a statute.
154 
149. Id. {Stevens, J., dissenting). 
150. Id. at 513 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
151. Id. at 513 n. l (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
152. Id. {Stevens, J., dissenting). 
153. United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960), United 
Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960), and United 
Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960) are collectively 
known as the Steelworkers Trilogy. The cases articulated the national labor policy 
favoring arbitration, including the presumption of arbitrability and judicial deference 
toward the arbitrator's decision. 
154. See Analysis: Supreme Court Continues Trend of Limiting Review of 
Arbitrators' Awards in Rejecting Ruling for Baseball Player, 167 LAB. REL. REP. (ENA), 
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Judicial review might be more searching. however, when 
the arbitration involves a statutory rather than a contractual 
claim. There has been substantial scholarly debate about the 
appropriate scope of review for arbitration awards on 
statutory claims.155 Although scholars have advocated de 
nova review of legal issues in arbitral decisions on statutory 
claims,156 most courts have refused to vacate awards on the 
basis of an erroneous legal interpretation. Rather, they have 
required a showing that the arbitrator acted in "manifest 
disregard of the law." 15' The latter is a narrow standard, 
which has been interpreted by many courts to require a 
demonstration that the arbitrator was aware of the correct 
interpretation of the law but failed to apply it.
158 
While there 
are certainly policy reasons for courts to review more 
carefully arbitral decisions on statutory claims in order to 
insure that statutory objectives are not being undermined, 
the Supreme Court's deference to arbitration this term 
provides optimism for those who advocate limited judicial 
review of all arbitration awards. 
C. The Justices and Arbitration 
Analysis of the positions of the justices in the arbitration 
cases reveals several patterns. In the cases involving 
enforcement of arbitration agreements under the FAA, five 
justices have consistently voted in favor of enforcement and 
four against. Voting in favor of enforcement are Chief Justice 
Rehnquist and Justices Scalia and Thomas, who typically 
vote against employee interests, and Justices Kennedy and 
O'Connor, who tend to be less predictable in employment 
cases.159 Justices Breyer, Ginsburg, Souter and Stevens, who 
155. See, e.g., RICHARD A. BALES. COMPULSORY ARBlTRATION: THE GRAND EXPERIMENT 
IN EMPWYMENT 137 {1997}; Robert N. Covington, Employment ArbiiTati.on After 
Gilmer: Have Labor Courts Come to the United States?, 15 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 
345 (1998): Stephen L. Hayford, Law in Disarray: Judicfal Standards for Vacatur of 
Commercial Arbitration Awards, 30 GA. L. REV. 731 (1996); Martin H. Malin & Robert 
F. Ladenson, Privatizing Justice: A Jurisprudential Perspective on Labor and 
Employment Arbitration from the Steelworkers Trllogy to Gilmer; 44 HASTINGS L.J. 
1187 (1993). 
156. Malin & Ladenson, supra note 155, at 1238, 1240. 
157. See BALES, supra note 155, at 136; Hayford, supra note 1$5, at 474. 
158. See BALES, supra note 155, at 136. 
159. See Ann C. Hodges & Douglas D. Scherer, The Employment Law Decisions of 
the October 1999 Tenn of the Supreme Court: A Review and Analysis, 4 EMPLOYEE 
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typically vote to protect employee interests, have been 
reluctant to enforce arbitration agreements imposed on 
employees and consumers with little bargaining power. 
Where the arbitration agreement is negotiated by a union, 
however, providing more power to the employees, all of the 
justices have been willing to defer to the arbitrator's decision 
in post-arbitral judicial review. The one exception was 
Justice Stevens in Garvey, but he argued only that the Court 
should have had briefing and argument before deciding 
whether to enforce the award. 
1. EEOC v. Waffle House 
The Court has granted certiorari in the case of EEOC v. 
WajJle House, '°0 a Fourth Circuit decision dealing with the 
impact of an arbitration agreement on the EEOC's ability to 
seek individual relief. The employee in WajJle House signed 
an application for employment requiring him to arbitrate any 
dispute or claim concerning his employment. 161 When he was 
terminated from his position of grill operator after suffering 
two seizures, he filed a charge with the EEOC alleging that 
his discharge violated the Americans with Disabilities Act. 
162 
The EEOC filed an enforcement action against the employer. 
In response, the employer asked the court to compel 
arbitration pursuant to the employee's agreement on the 
application, and either stay or dismiss the court action.
163 
The district court denied arbitration on the ground that the 
employee's application, and therefore the arbitration 
agreement, had been filed at a facility other than the one at 
which he was hired. 164 The Fourth Circuit disagreed, and 
went on to analyze whether the arbitration agreement affected 
the EEOC's action. 165 
The court began by recognizing that the ADA contains a 
"dual enforcement system" which gives rights to individuals 
Rrs. &EMPWYMENTPOL'YJ. 177, 179 (2000). 
160. 193 F.3d 805 (4th Cir. 1999). cert. granted, 121 S. Ct. 1401 (2001). 
161. Id. at 807. 
162. rd. 
163. Id. at 808. 
164. Id. 
165. Id. at 808-09. 
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and the EEOC. 166 Thus, the EEOC has an independent right 
and duty to enforce the statute, acting in the public interest 
rather than the interest of any individual affected by 
discrimination. 167 The Supreme Court indicated in Gilmer v. 
Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp.168 that an arbitration agree-
ment does not prevent an employee from filing a charge of 
discrimination with the EEOC, and stated that arbitration 
agreements "will not preclude the EEOC from bringing 
actions seeking class-wide and equitable relief." 169 Relying on 
Gilmer, and the statutory provisions authorizing independent 
EEOC actions, the court decided that the EEOC could not be 
compelled to arbitrate pursuant to an employee's arbitration 
agreement. 110 Nevertheless, the court concluded that the. 
policy favoring arbitration barred the EEOC from seeking 
individual relief for the employee.171 The EEOC could, 
however, seek both affirmative and negative injunctive relief 
barring discrimination on the basis of disability and requiring 
the employer to establish policies to provide equal employ-
ment opportunities for individuals with disabilities. 
112 
Prior to the Waffle House decision, the Sixth Circuit and 
the Second Circuit had addressed the effect of individual 
arbitration agreements on the EEOC's authority to sue. In 
EEOC v. Kidder, Peabody, Inc., 173 an Age Discrimination in 
Employment Act (ADEA) 174 case, the Second Circuit held that 
an arbitration agreement precluded the EEOC from seeking 
monetary relief on behalf of a charging party. but not broad 
injunctive relief. Because the case sought only monetary 
damages, it was dismissed. 175 In EEOC v. Frank's Nursery & 
Crafts, Inc., 116 the Sixth Circuit found the EEOC's suit 
166. Id. at810-ll. 
167. Id. at 811. 
168. 500 U.S. 20, 28 (1991). 
169. Id. at 32, quoted in Waffle House, 193 F.3d at 811. 
170. Waffie House, 193 F.3d at 811. 
1 71. Id. at 812-13 (barring the EEOC from proceeding in court seeking back pay, 
reinstatement, compensatory or punitive damages for the employee). 
172. Id. at 812-13. Judge King dissented, agreeing with the district court that 
there was no agreement to arbitrate. Id. at 813-14 {King, J., dissenting). 
173. 156 F.3d 298 (2d Cir. 1998). 
174. 29 u.s.c. §§ 621-34 (1994). 
175. 156 F.3d at 301-03. 
176. 177 F.3d 448 (6th Cir. 1999). 
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unaffected by an individual's arbitration agreement."' The 
circuit split led to the grant of certiorari. 
The majority in Frank's Nursery wrote a lengthy opinion 
supporting its decision. 178 Like the Fourth Circuit, the Sixth 
Circuit analyzed the statute, legislative history and prior 
decisions, concluding that charging parties and the EEOC 
have separate and independent causes of action. 179 The 
charging party's agreement to arbitrate could not bind the 
EEOC, which was not a party to the arbitration agreement, 
nor did the agreement waive the EEOC's independent right to 
litigate, which attached once the charge was filed. 180 The 
independence of the claim, and the EEOC's broader public 
interest, convinced the Sixth Circuit to permit the EEOC to 
recover damages for the individual despite the arbitration 
agreement. 181 The court concluded that the doctrines of 
preclusion, election of remedies and waiver did not bar the 
EEOC's claim for relieffor the individual. 182 
The Second Circuit in Kidder, Peabody analogized the 
case to an individual's settlement or waiver of her claim, 
which precludes the EEOC from seeking relief on her 
behalf. 183 The Sixth Circuit, however, determined that, 
because the individual did not control the EEOC's decision of 
whether to litigate, the individual could not deprive the EEOC 
of its authority by agreeing t<;> arbitrate. 184 The court further 
noted that allowing individual agreements to limit the agency 
to injunctive relief would interfere with the EEOC's ability to 
enforce' the statute in the public interest, particularly where 
the Supreme Court has stated that monetary relief is 
177. Id. at 455. 
178. Id. at 452-68 A dissent by Judge Nelson agreed with the Second Circuit's 
opinion in EEOC v._. Kid<!er, Peabody that the EEOC could sue for injunctive relief, 
but not private remedies· for the individual. Id. at 470-71 (Nelson, J., dissenting). 
179. Id. at 454. 
180. Id. at 455. Although the underlying claim in Frank's Nursery & Crafts was a 
Title VII claim and tile claim in Wajfle House an ADA claim, the procedures under 
the two statutes, and the EEOC's role, are the same because the ADA adopted and 
incorporated the enforcement procedures of Title VII. See 29 U.S.C. § 12117(a) 
(1994); 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-4, 2000e-5, 2000e-6, 2000e-8, 2000e-9 (1994). 
181. 177 F.3d at 466. 
182. Id. at 467. 
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essential to statutory enforcement. 185 The court responded to 
the argument that allowing the EEOC to sue for individual 
damages would permit charging parties to avoid arbitration 
agreements, noting that the individual has no control over 
EEOC decisions to sue, and given the EEOC's limited 
litigation resources, most individuals with arbitration 
agreements can not avoid them by filing an EEOC charge. 
186 
This case poses for the Court a choice between enforcing 
an arbitration agreement to the point of preventing an 
employee from any judicial recovery on a claim subject to 
arbitration and recognizing the EEOC's statutory authority to 
proceed in the public interest even where it means seeking a 
judicial remedy for an employee who has agreed to arbitrate. 
The EEOC has a strong statutory argument, particularly in 
light of amendments to Title VII in 1972 and 1991, both of 
which granted the agency authority to pursue relief for 
individuals and expressly indicated that such relief was in the 
public interest. 187 While the Fourth Circuit's decision leaves 
the agency free to seek "broad injunctive relief," it is not clear 
precisely what that is and whether it would be available in a 
case involving an individual instance of discrimination.
188 
In 
addition, preclusion of individual relief may discourage 
employees with arbitration agreements from filing charges, 
diluting the EEOC's ability to enforce the statute even with 
broad injunctive relief, as the agency is unlikely to be aware 
of discrimination if no charges are filed. 189 If employers are 
successful in limiting the EEOC's ability to obtain individual 
relief for employees and in precluding class action claims 
using arbitration agreements, the effective enforcement of 
185. Id. at 466 (quoting Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody. 422 U.S. 405, 417 (1975)). 
186. Id. at 468. 187. See Waffie House, Inc., Brief for Petitioner, No. 9'9-1$23, 122 S. Ct. 754 
(2002), 2001 WL 603394 at '17 (May 25, 2001) (citing 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e·5(a), 
2000e·5lnlll (1994): 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981a(a)(1) & (a)(2) (1994)): id. at '28-29. 
188. Waffle House argued that broad relief was unavailable for that reason, but 
the Court did not decide the issue, leaving it to the district court on remand. 193 
F.3d at 813 n.3. 189. See Waffle House, Brief of the States of Missouri, Alaska, AriZona, Arkansas, 
California, Colorado, Florida, Hawaii, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Louisiana, 
Maryland, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Jersey, New 
Mexico, New York, Ohio, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Utah, Vermont, West Virginia 
and the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands In Support of Petitioner, 
No. 99·1823, 122 S. Ct. 754 (2002), 2001 WL 575440, at '8·9 (May 25, 2001). 
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employment discrimination statutes will be severely 
undermined. The potential impact of the decision is far 
broader than discrimination claims, as it could limit the 
ability of federal and state agencies with enforcement 
authority under various statutes to seek individual relief. 190 If 
the EEOC can persuade one or more of the five justices that 
strongly favor enforcement of arbitration agreements that the 
statutory language and clear congressional intent permit the 
agency to seek individual relief, the agency may prevail. 
Although Justices Kennedy and O'Connor are typically the 
swing votes, the statutory language argument may convince 
Justices Scalia and Thomas to rule in favor of the EEOC. The 
judicial momentum favoring arbitration is strong, however, 
and may carry the day in Walfle House as well. 191 
Ill. EMPLOYEE BENEFITS 
A. Egelhoff v. Egelhoff - The Court Addresses ERISA 
Preemption 
Like arbitration issues in recent years, ERISA preemption 
issues have provided much fodder for the Court. 192 The most 
190. See id. at -*4-5, *12-13 (noting various statutes that would be affected 
including civil rights laws, such as employment discrimination and fair housing 
laws, and consumer protections laws). Many federal statutes have anti-retaliation 
provisions enforced by agencies that might be affected as well. See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. § 
215 (a){3) (1994) {prohibiting discrimination against any employee for exercising 
rights under the Fair Labor Standards Act): Id.§ 660(c}(l)(prohibiting discrimination 
'against any employee for exercising rtghts under the Occupational Safety and Health 
Act). 
191. Editor's Note. On January 15, 2002, the Supreme Court decided EEOC v. 
Waifle House, 122 S. Ct. 754 (2002). The Court held that EEOC may seek individual 
remedies for a victim of employment discrimination, even though the victim signed a 
binding arbitration agreement that covers employment disputes. The Court held 
that "the EEOC has authority to pursue victim-specific relief regardless of the forum 
that the employer and employee have chosen to resolve their dispute." 122 S. Ct. at 
765. Justice Stevens' opinion for the Court was joined by Justices Breyer, Ginsburg, 
Kennedy, O'Connor, and Souter. Justice Thomas filed a dissenting opinion that was 
joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Scalia. 
192. As in the case of arbitration, the Court has already granted certiorari in a 
preemption case for next term. See Moran v. Rush Prudential HMO, Inc., 230 F.3d 
959 (7th Cir. 2000), cert. granted, 121 S. Ct. 2589 (2001). Moran involves an Illinois 
law that requires health maintenance organizations ("HMOs") to provide for 
independent review by a physician where the primary care physician and the HMO 
disagree about the medical necessity of a treatment. Id. at 968. If the independent 
physician deems the treatment medically necessary, the law requires the HMO to 
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recent preemption case, Egelhoff v. Egelho.ff, 193 dealt with a 
Washington state statute which provided that upon divorce, 
designation of a spouse as a beneficiary of a non-probate 
asset was revoked automatically. 194 Two lawsuits were 
initiated in state court by the children of a deceased man to 
recover the proceeds of his life insurance policy and the 
benefits of his pension plan, both of which designated his 
former wife as beneficiary.195 Although the trial courts ruled 
that the state statute revoking the beneficiary designation 
was preempted by ERISA, both the state court of appeals, 
after consolidating the cases, and the Washington Supreme 
Court held that the statute was not preempted.
196 
Justice Thomas' majority opm10n reversing the 
Washington Supreme Court was joined by Chief Justice 
Rehnquist, and Justices O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, Souter 
and Ginsburg. The opinion recognized the breadth of ERISA's 
preemption provision, !Jut noted that it cannot be read 
literally because preemption of all statutes that "relate to" any 
employee benefit plan could nullify virtually all state 
legislation.197 Relying on more recent decisions which read 
the scope of ERISA preemption more narrowly, Justice 
Thomas indicated that the Court must look to the purpose of 
ERISA and the effect of the state law on ERISA plans to 
determine whether Congress intended to preempt the state 
preemption by the insurance savings clause of ERISA because it regulated 
insurance. Id. at 969-70 (citing 29U.S.C.§l144(b)(2)(A) (1994)). Further, the panel 
concluded, contrary to the Fifth Circuit in Corporate Health Ins., Inc. v. Texas Dep't 
of Ins., 215 F.3d 526 (5th Cir. 2000). that the state law did not conflict with ER!SA 
because the Illinois statute required incorporation of the review provision into the 
plan and thus a suit for enforcement of the state law was nothing more than a suit 
under ERISA to enforce the plan. 230 F.3d 970-71. Judge Posner, dissenting from 
the denial of a petition for rehearing en bane, argued that if the law is incorporated 
into the plan, then the law is regulating the plan, not merely insurance, and 
therefore should be preempted. Id .. at 974 (Posner, C.J., dissenting). The Seventh 
Circuit's decision permits state law regulation of benefits decisions by insurance 
plans and will undermine the goal of plan uniformity. Yet it applies to all HMOs 
regardless of whether they provide benefits under an ERISA plan. The Supreme 
Court's decision in Moran will further define the scope and application of the 
preemption provision and the insurance savings clause of ERISA. 
193. 121 S. Ct. 1322 (2001). 
194. Id. at 1324. 
195. Id. 196. In re Estate of Egelhoff, 968 P.2d 924 (Wash. Ct. App. 1998), ajfd, 989 P.2d 
80 (Wash. 1999), rev'dsub nom. Egelhoffv. Egelhoff. 121 S. Ct. 1322 (2001). 
197. 121 S. Ct. at 1324-25. 
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law.198 Because the state statute directed ERISA plan 
administrators to pay benefits in accordance with state law 
rather than the plan, the connection between the state law 
and ERISA plans was one that required preemption.
199 
The 
statute dealt with a core aspect of plan administration, 
payment of benefits, and interfered with a central purpose of 
ERISA, providing uniform national standards for benefit 
plans.200 Thus, the statute imposed a burden on 
administrators of ERISA plans to determine which state law 
might apply and affect designation of beneficiary status, 
rather than simply complying with the plan itself.
201 
Tbe 
majority concluded that the state law directly conflicted with 
ERISA, which requires administrators to pay benefits in 
accordance with plan requirements.
202 
Justice Breyer, joined by Justice Stevens, dissented, 
finding no direct conflict between ERISA and the state law.
20
' 
Justice Breyer read the Washington statute as providing a 
default rule, which applied only where the plan did not 
provide otherwise.204 He noted that the plans at issue said 
nothing about the validity of a beneficiary designation, except 
for recognizing that a designation might become invalid, and 
thus it made sense for state inheritance law to fill the gaps.
205 
There is a presumption against preemption where, as here, 
the law is' in an area of traditional state regulation.
206 
Justice 
Breyer viewed the burden of administration imposed by the 
statute to be minimal, and saw the state statute as consistent 
198. Id. at 1331. 
199. Id. at 1332. 
200. Id. at 1325. 
201. Id. 202. Id. at 1329. The ability of plan administrators to opt out of the state law with 
specific plan language did not save the statute from preemption, because plan 
administrators still would have to ascertain all state laws, monitor state laws for 
changes, and tailor and modify plans in accordance with state law. Id. 
203. Id. at 1331-35 {Breyer J., dissenting). Justice Scalia wrote a brief con-
currence in which Justice Ginsburg joined, agreeing that the direct conflict between 
ERISA and the state law triggered preemption, but noting uncertainty as to what else 
might be preempted. Id. at 1330 {Scalia, J., concurring). He noted that, in his view, 
ERISA preemption must be interpreted in accord with "ordinary pre-emption 
jurisprudence." Id. at 1331. 
204. Id. at 1331 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
205. Id. 
206. Id. 
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with ERISA's goal of protecting employee benefits.
207 
Accordingly, since he found no conflict and no preemption of 
the field, and the state statute did not prevent the 
accomplishment of any federal objective, Justice Breyer 
would find no preemption."' 
While the majoriiy saw the state statute as conflicting 
with ERISA's requirement that plan administrators follow 
plan documents,'0' the dissent viewed the state statute as 
merely filling in the gaps in the plan where terms were not 
defined or beneficiary designations were not clear.
210 
The 
state statute's involvement with probate and family law, areas 
of traditional state regulation, might have presaged a decision 
upholding the state law, but the potential for conflicting 
obligations for plan administrators regarding payment of 
benefits convinced the majoriiy to preempt the statute. 
There are other state statutes that similarly impact plan 
administration. An example cited in the opinion is slayer 
statutes, laws that bar murderers from inheriting from their 
victims and thereby benefitting from their crtmes.
211 
While 
the majoriiy did not decide the issue, it suggested that the 
state slayer laws and their underlying principle are virtually 
uniform and longstanding, perhaps minimizing their 
interference with ERISA's aims.212 Justice Breyer, on the 
other hand, pointed out the differences in state slayer 
statutes, particularly with respect to proof, and noted that 
unlike the divorce revocation ·statute, "few, if any, slayer 
statutes permit plans to opt out of the state properiy law 
rule."213 The petitioner, arguing in favor of preemption of the 
divorce revocation statute, distinguished the slayer statutes, 
suggesting that they were so uniform and well-settled at the 
time of ERISA's passage that they were incorporated into 
207. Id. at 1334 (noting that it was likely that the plan participant would have 
preferred that the benefits go to the children). 
208. Id. at 1335. 
209. See 29 U.S.C. § Jl32(a)(l)(B) (1994) (authorizing plan participants and 
beneficiaries to sue to enforce the terms of pension and benefit plans covered by 
ERJSA). 
210. 121 S. Ct. at 1331 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
21 !. Id. at 1330. 
212. Id. 
213. Id. at 1334 (Breyer, J., dissenting}. 
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ERISA as federal common law.21 " Other statutes that might be 
affected by the decision include simultaneous death statutes 
and statutes defining death, spouse and child for purposes of 
inheritance."' 
Like the Court's earlier preemption decisions, the 
decision provides no clear line or test to determine ERISA 
preemption issues. Discerning the preemptive intent of 
Congress, and separating those instances where preemption 
was intended from the vast number of statutes that "relate to" 
employee benefit plans, is a daunting task. It seems likely 
that case by case analysis will continue to prevail in this 
area, and that ERISA preemption issues will provide fuel for 
Supreme Court cases for years to come. 
B. Ragsdale v. Wolverine Worldwide, Inc. 
The Court will revisit employee benefits during the 
October 2001 Term in Ragsdale v. Wolverine Worldwide, 
Inc."' The Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider the 
validity of the Department of Labor's regulation requiring 
covered employers to designate Family Medical Leave Act 
("FMLA") leave at the time it is granted, and precluding 
employers from later counting undesignated leave against the 
employee's statutory twelve week leave entitlement.
217 
The 
Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit concluded that the 
regulation was invalid because it "directly contradict[edl the 
statute by increasing the amount of leave that an employer 
must provide."218 
ln. the case at issue, Ragsdale became ill with cancer 
before she had worked for the employer for one year.
219 
Since 
214. Id. (making the argument with respect to the slayer rule and also suggesting 
that the simultaneous death rule might be similarly incorporated). 
215. Transcript of Oral Argument, Egelhoff v. Egelhoff, 121 S. Ct. 1322, No. 99-
1529, 2000 U.S. Trans. {Lexis) 68, at *2-5 {Nov. 8, 2000): see also Brief of tlle States 
of Washington, Arkansas, Colorado, Massachusetts, Montana, Oklahoma, Utah, 
Vermont, and West Virginia, as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents, 1999 U.S. 
Briefs (Lexis) 1529, at '14 (Sept. 18, 2000). 
216. 218 F.3d 933 (8th Cir. 2000). cert. granted. 121 S. Ct. 2548 (2001). 
217. The regulation invalidated by the Court of Appeals is found at 29 C.F.R. § 
825.700(a) (2001). 
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she had not worked for one year, she was not yet eligible for 
FMLA leave, but was entitled to leave under the employer's 
plan. Pursuant to that plan she was granted seven months of 
leave in thirty day increments. She was terminated for 
exhausting her leave, and since she was still unable to work, 
she requested FMLA leave. The employer informed her that 
she had exhausted all of her leave, and denied her request to 
work on a reduced hour schedule. Several months later, she 
was released to work and returned to full time work at 
another employer. Ragsdale's FMLA claim was based on the 
regulation. She contended that since the employer did not 
designate her prior leave as FMLA leave, she remained 
entitled to FMLA leave after she exhausted the leave available 
under the employer's plan. 
If, as the court of appeals concluded, the regulation 
contradicts the statute, then it must be invalidated under 
Chevron.220 The court's rationale is based on the intent of 
Congress to provide twelve weeks of leave as a minimum 
labor standard, designed to balance the needs of employers 
and employees.221 Since the regulations require employers to 
provide additional leave under some circumstances, the court 
found them inconsistent with the statute. In addition, the 
court noted that Congress incorporated explicit notice 
provisions with specified penalties elsewhere in the statute, 
and thus its failure to do so here indicates a lack of intent, 
which the administrative agency carinot override.
222 
The court 
acknowledged, however, that a regulation requiring 
contemporaneous designation of FMLA leave under some 
circumstances might be valid, giving the example of an 
employee whose rights were denied because she could have 
returned to work after twelve weeks but failed to do so 
because she was not notified that the leave was FMLA 
leave."23 Amici for the employer argued that the regulation 
discourages employers from providing leave in excess of the 
FMLA entitlement for fear that it would be used to extend 
leave, rather than to coincide with FMLA leave and allow 
220. See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 
U.S. 837 (1984). 
221. 218 F.3d at 939. 
222. Id. at 938-39. 
223. Id. at 939-40. 
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employees to receive payment.22' 
The regulation does not mandate more than twelve weeks 
of leave, however, unless the employer fails to designate leave 
as FMLA leave. Since the statute does not specify when 
FMLA leave begins or how employers and employees 
communicate their intent to substitute paid employer leave 
for unpaid FMLA leave,22' the regulation can be read as filling 
gaps left by the statute rather than contradicting it.
226 
Moreover, it is designed to effectuate the statute by requiring 
that employees be given notice of their rights, thereby 
enabling employees to plan an appropriate balance of family 
and work obligations.22' Under this reading, the regulation 
would be upheld as a permissible agency interpretation 
designed to fill a gap in the statute. 228 
Given these two divergent readings of the regulation, the 
Court is likely to break down along familiar lines, with the 
justices traditionally favoring employer interests finding the 
regulation invalid and those favoring employee interests 
voting to uphold the regulation.220 As in many cases, Justices 
Kennedy and O'Connor, the swing votes, are likely to 
determine the outcome. 
224. Brief Arptci Curiae of the Equal Employment Advisory Council, LPA, Inc.,and 
the Chamber of Commerce of the United States in Support of Respondent, 2000 U.S. 
Briefs (Lexis) 6029, at '15-18 (Oct. 5, 2001). 
225. The statute permits such substitution at the request of either party. 29 
U.S.C.§ 2602(d)(2)(A) (1994). 
226. See Brief Amici Curiae of the National Employment Lawyers Associaiton, 
, AARP, Equal Rights Advocates, the Legal Aid Society-Employment Law Center, 
National Depressive and Manic-Depressive Association, and the National Women's 
Law Center in Support of Petitioners, 2000 U.S. Briefs Lexis 6029, at *8-10 {Sept. 7, 
2001). 
227. Id; at *8-13; Brief for the United States As Amicus Curiae Supporting 
Petitioners, 2000 U.S. Briefs {Lexis) 6029 at *16-17 {Sept. 7, 2001). If the employer 
could retroactively designate leave, there would be little incentive to comply with 
notice requirements and _there would be a risk of leave manipulation by the 
employer. Brief of the American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial 
Organizations and the National Partnership for Women and Families as Amicus Curiae 
in Support of Petitioners, 2000 U.S. Briefs {Lexis) 6029, at *18-19 {Sept. 7, 2001} 
(arguing that the categorical rule selected by the Secretary of Labor best effectuates 
the statutory purpose as contrasted with the suggestion of the court of appeals that 
retroactive designation be prohibited only where the employee demonstrates a 
material detriment). 
228. See Chevfon, 467 U.S. at 842-43. 
229. See Hodges & Scherer, supra note 159, at 179 (noting that Chief Justice 
Rehnquist and Justices Scalia and Thomas consistently favor employer interests, 
and Justices Breyer, Ginsburg, Souter and Stevens generally support employee 
interests), 
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IV. LIMITING PLAINTIFFS' RIGHTS UNDER THE AMERICANS WITH 
DISABILITIES ACT: THE ELEVENTH AMENDMENT AND ATTORNEY'S 
FEES DEVELOPMENTS 
A. Board ofTrustees of the University of Alabama v. Garrett 
Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 
(ADA)230 prohibits employment discrimination on the basis of 
disability by state and local governments, and by private 
sector employers with 15 or more employees.231 Together with 
other provisions of the ADA, Title I seeks to accomplish the 
congressional purpose of "[providing] a clear and 
comprehensive national mandate for the elimination of. 
discrimination against individuals with disabilities[.)"232 The 
principal Title I enforcement mechanism consists ·of federal 
court actions brought by individuals alleging disability 
discrimination, following investigation of discrimination 
charges filed by these individuals with the EEOC.
233 
In Board of Trustees of the . University of Alabama v. 
Garrett,234 the Supreme Court concluded that this enforce-
ment mechanism, as applied to state government employers, 
violates the Eleventh Amendment to the Constitution.· The 
Eleventh Amendment provides, "The Judicial power of the 
United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in 
law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the 
United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or 
Subjects of any Foreign State."235 . The Eleventh Amendment 
does not bar a private action in federal court if the state has 
consented to being sued, and Congress may abrogate the 
states' immunity from suit if it "unequivocally intends to do 
230. 42 u.s.c. §§ 12101-12213 (1994). 
231. The ADA defines "employer" as "a pers0:n engag~d in an industry affecting 
commerce who has 15 or more employees for each working day in each of 20 or more 
calendar weeks in the current or preceding calendar year, and any agent of such 
person ... ," Id. § 12111(5}(A). The term "employer" includes state and local 
governments, but is subject to exceptions for the federal government, Indian tribes, 
and bona fide private membership clubs. Id.§ 121l1(5)(B). 
232. Id§ 12101 (b)(l). 
233. Under Title I, persons alleging disability discrimination in employment must 
file charges with the EEOC, and must obtain a notice of right to sue from the EEOC 
as a prerequisite to filing a federal court action. 
234. 531 U.S. 356 (2001). 
235. U. S. CONST. amend. XI. 
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so and 'acts pursuant to a valid grant of constitutional 
authority. "'236 
In Fitzpabick v. Bitzer, 237 the Court held that Section 5 of 
the Fourteenth Arnendment238 gives Congress power to 
abrogate the states' sovereign immunity from suit by private 
individuals alleging employment discrimination under Title 
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.239 Subsequent cases 
established that Congress' enforcement power under Section 
5 goes beyond prohibiting conduct that violates the Equal 
Protection Clause, and extends to "prohibiting a somewhat 
broader swath of conduct, including that which is not itself 
forbidden by the Amendment's text."2' 0 
Fitzpabick supported congressional efforts to combat 
discrimination by state govermnent employers on the grounds 
of race, color, religion, sex, and national origin. Intentional 
discrimination based upon any of these categories, each of 
which is listed in Title VII, also would violate the Equal 
Protection Clause, unless the classification in question 
survives heightened judicial scrutiny.241 Garrett, on the other 
hand, involves discrimination on the basis of disability, a 
236. 531 U.S. at 363 (quoting Kimel v. Flortda Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 73 
(2000)). Garrett is the latest in a recent series of Eleventh Amendment cases that 
have focused On the power of Congress to create private party causes of action 
against_states. This subject will be revisited by the Court in its October 2001 Term 
consideration of Raygor v. Regents of University ofMtnnesota, 620 N.W.2d 680 (Minn. 
2001), cert. granted, 121 S. Ct. 2214 (2001). Raygor involves the constitutionality, 
under the Eleventh Amendment, of 28 U.S.C. §1367(d), a federal supplemental 
jurisdiction statute that tolls the running of state statutes of limitations for state law 
" claims (including employment law claims) pending in federal court. 
237. 427 U.S. 445 (1976). 
238. Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment provides, in relevant part: "No State 
shall ... deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." 
Section 5 provides: 'The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate 
legislation, the provisions of this article." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. 
239. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-l to 2000e-17 (1994). 
240. Kimel v. Flortda Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 81 (2000) (quoting City of 
Boernev. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 517 {1997)). 
241. Strict scrutiny applies to classifications based upon race, national origin, and 
religion, which means that a government defendant must prove that the 
classification serves a compelling government purpose, and that the means used are 
narrowly tailored. to achieve that purpose. See, e.g., Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. 
Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995) ("[Racial] classifications are constitutional only if 
they are narrowly tailored measures that further compelling governmental 
interests."). Middle-tier scrutiny applies to classifications based upon gender, which 
means that a government defendant must prove that the classification "[s]erves 
important governmental objectives and [is] substantially related to achievement of 
those objectives." Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976). 
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category that has not been subjected to heightened judicial 
scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause.2 ' 2 Similarly, last 
term's decision by the Court in Kimel v. Florida Board of 
Regents2'' involved age discriminatio.n, another category that 
does not receive heightened judicial scrutiny under the Equal 
Protection Clause.244 In Kimel, the Court held that the 
Eleventh Amendment prevents private individuals from 
bringing actions in federal court against state defendants 
under the ADEA. 
The distinguishing case between Fitzgerald, invo.lving 
race discrimination under Title VII, and Garrett and Kimel, 
involving disability discrimination under the ADA and age 
discrimination under the ADEA, respectively, is City ofBoeme 
v. Flores.245 City of Boerne, a 1997 decision, considered the 
constitutionality of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 
1993 (RFRA).246 RFRA provided that government may not 
substantially burden a person's exercise of religion, even by a 
rule of general applicability, unless "the government can 
demonstrate the burden '(l) is in furtherance of a compelling 
governmental interest; and (2) is the least restrictive means of 
furthering that compelling government interest. "'
247 
The Court 
considered whether Congress had the power under Section 5 
of the Fourteenth Amendment to enact RFRA. The Due 
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment protects 
242. In City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Uving Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 437 {1985), the 
Court determined that governmental discrimination on the basis of mental 
retardation is subject to rational basis scrutiny. The Court held that "[t}o withstand 
equal protection review, legislation that distinguishes between the mentally retarded 
and others must be rationally related to a legitimate gov~mmental purpose." Id. at 
446. 
243. 528 U.S. 62 (2000). 244. The Court applies rational basis scrutiny to disability and age classifications, 
which means that a party challenging the classification must prove that there is no 
rational connection between the classification and achievement of a legitimate 
governmental objective. The Court expressed this in .Ktmel as follows: "States may 
discriminate on the basis of age without offending the Fourteehth Amendment if the 
age classification in question is rationally related to a legitimate state interest." Id. 
at 83. The Court previously applied rational basis scrutiny to age classifications in 
Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452 {1991} (mandatory re1;irement of state court judges 
at the age of 70}, Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement. v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 301 (1976} 
(mandatory retirement of state police officers at the age of 50}, and Vance v. Bradley, 
440 U.S. 93 (1973} (mandatory retirement of foreign service ·officers at age 60). 
245. 521 U.S. 507 (1997). 
246. Pub. L. No. 103-41, 107 Stat. 1488 (1993) (codified at42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb-l 
to 4 (1994)). 
247. 521 U.S. at 515-6 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-l). 
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persons from violations of the Free Exercise Clause of the 
First Amendment,248 but the definition of violation under 
RFRA is far more stringent than the constitutional test. In 
City of Boerne, the Court articulated the doctrine that it later 
applied in Garrett and Kimel. For an exercise by Congress of 
Section 5 power to be valid, "[t]here must be a congruence 
and proportionality between the injury to be prevented or 
remedied and the means adopted to that end."249 This means 
that "[t]he appropriateness of remedial measures must be 
considered in light of the evil presented. Strong measures 
appropriate to address one harm may be an unwarranted 
response to another .... "250 In City of Boerne, congruence 
and proportionality were absent because the RFRA statutory 
prohibition far exceeded the scope of governmental action 
that would violate the Free Exercise of Religion Clause.251 
Therefore, the Section 5 remedial power of Congress is 
dependent upon there being a constitutional violation to be 
remedied, and the means chosen by Congress must be 
congruent with, and proportional to, the violation to be 
remedied and prevented. Chief Justice Rehnquist expressed 
these requirements as follows: "[I]n order to authorize private 
individuals to recover money damages against the States, 
there must be a pattern of discrimination by the States which 
violates the Fourteenth Amenqment, and the remedy imposed 
by Congress must be congruent and proportional to the 
targeteq violation."252 The majority and dissenting opinions in 
Garrett accepted these dual principles, but disagreed about 
the amount of deference the Court should give to 
congressional fact-finding. 
Patricia Garrett worked as a Director of Nursing for the 
University of Alabama in Birmingham Hospital. She alleged 
that the University violated Title I of the ADA by 
discriminating against her because of her breast cancer. 
248. U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
249. 521 U.S. at at 520. 
250. Id. at 530 (citation omitted). 
251. In Employment Div., Dep't of Human Resources v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990), 
the Court held that the Free Exercise of Religion Clause of the First Amendment is 
not violated by a "valid and neutral law of general applicability." 494 U.S. at 879 
(quoting United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 263 n.3 {1982) (Stevens, J., 
concurring)). 
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Milton Ash, who worked as a security officer for the Alabama 
Department of Youth Services, alleged that his employer 
refused to accommodate his asthma and sleep apnea in 
violation of Title I. In a combined decision, the district court 
granted the defendants' motions for summary judgment on 
Eleventh Amendment grounds,253 and the Eleventh Circuit 
Court of Appeals reversed.
254 
Chief Justice Rehnquist's opinion for the Court.in Garrett 
was joined by Justices O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, and 
Thomas. Justice Breyer's dissent was joined by Justices 
Stevens, Souter, and Ginsburg. The majority and dissenting 
opinions disagreed sharply over the extent to which the 
congressional record revealed a pattern of unconstitutional 
disability-based discrimination in employment by the states. 
Because disability classifications are subject to rational basis 
scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause, the Constitution 
is violated only by governwental action that lacks a rational 
connection to achievement of a legitimate · governmental 
interest.255 Thus, the majority and dissenting opinions differed 
over whether the employment practices of the states involved 
a pattern of irrational exclusion and discrimination. 
Chief Justice Rehnquist concluded that "[t]he legislative 
record of the ADA ... simply fails to show that Congress did 
in fact identify a pattern of irrational state discrimination in 
employment against the disabled."256 Although the .record 
revealed instances of failure by states to accommodate 
disabled people, "[w]hether they were irrational ... is more 
debatable."257 Chief Justice Rehnquist continued, "But even if 
it were to be determined that eac.h incident upon fuller 
examination showed unconstitutional action .on the part of 
the State, these incidents taken together fall far short of even 
suggesting the pattern of unconstitutional discrimination on 
which§ 5 legislation must be based."
258 
253. Garrett v. Board of Trustees of Alabama in Birmingham and Ash v. Alabama 
Department of Youth Services, 989 F. Supp. 1409 (N.D. Ala. 1998), reu'd, 193 F.3d 
1214 (11th Cir. 1999), rev'd, 531 U.S. 356 (2001). 
254. Garrett v. Board of Trustees of Alabama in Birminghani. 193 F.3d 1214 {1 lth 
Cir. 1999), rev'd, 531 U.S. 356 (2001) . 
255. See supra note 244 and accompanying text. 
256. 531 U.S. at 368. 
257. Id. at 370. 258. Id. The concurring opinion of Justice Kennedy, joined by Justice O'Connor, 
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The dissent criticized the majority for "[r]eviewing the 
congressional record as if it were an administrative record. "259 
The dissent concluded: 
To apply a rule designed to restrict courts as if it restricted 
Congress' legislative power is to stand the underlying 
principle - a principle of judicial restraint - on its head. 
But without the use of this burden of proof rule or some 
other unusually stringent standard of review, it is difficult 
to see how the Court . can find the legislative record here 
inadequate. Read with a reasonably favorable eye, the 
record indicates that state govermnents subjected those 
with disabilities to seriously adverse, disparate treatment. 260 
The majority applied the Boerne congruence and 
proportionality test to the ADA prohibition against disparate 
impact discrimination261 and ADA obligation to reasonably 
also concluded that a pattern of unconstitutional state conduct had not been 
established: 
The predicate for money damages against an unconsenting State in suits 
brought by private persons must be a federal statute enacted upon tile 
documentation of patterns of constitutional violations committed by the 
State in its official capacity. That predicate, for reasons discussed here and 
in the decision of the Court, has not been established. 
Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
259. Id. (Breyer, J., dissenting). Justice Breyer wrote: "In reviewing§ 5 legislation, 
we have never required the sort of extensive investigation of each piece of evidence 
that the Court appears to contemplate .... Nor has the Court traditionally required 
Congress to make findings as to state discrimination, or to break down the record 
evidence, category by category." Id. at 380 {Breyer, J., dissenting). Justice Breyer 
also referred to "roughly 300 examples·· of discrimination by state governments 
themselves in the legislative record." Id. at 379. He wrote, "I fail to see how this 
evidence 'falls far short of even suggesting the pattern of unconstitutional 
discrimination on which § 5 legislation must be based."' Id 
260. Id at 385 (Breyer, J., dissenting). An example of the information available to 
Congress was provided by the Solicitor General; 
[W]hile the Disabilities Act was before Congress, the Advisory Committee on 
Intergovernmental Relations {ACIR) {consisting of six Members of Congress 
and eleven representatives of state and local governments] smveyed state 
compliance with prohibitions on employment disclimination and reported 
that 350/o of responding state and local governments had no employees with 
disabilities, and half had only "one or two." ACIR, Disability Rights 
Mandates 64 (1989). Further, 82°/o of state and local government employers 
harbored moderate to strong negative attitudes and misconceptions about 
hiring persons with disabilities, based on stereotypes, prejudice, and 
"feelings of discomfort in associating with disabled individuals." 
Garrett, Brief for the United States, No. 99-1240, 531 U.S. 356, 1999 U.S. Briefs 
(Lexis) 1240 at •33.34 (Aug. 11, 2000). 
261. The ADA provides that "[n]o covered entity shall discriminate against a 
qualified individual with a disability because of the disability of such individual .... " 
42 U.S.C.§ 12112{a) (1994). The ADA defines "discriminate" to include "utilizing 
standards, criteria, or methods of administration - (A) that have the effect of 
discrimination on the basis of disability .... " Id. § 12112 (b)(3), and "using 
qualification standards, employment tests or other selection criteria that screen out 
or tend to screen-out an individual with a disability ... unless the standard, test, or 
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accommodate disabled persons,262 and concluded, "Even were 
it possible to squeeze out of these examples a pattern of 
unconstitutional discrimination by the States, the rights and 
remedies created by the ADA against the States would raise 
the same sort of concerns as to congruence and 
proportionality as were found in City of Boerne ... ,"263 
The dissent found sufficient evidence of irrational 
employment discrimination by states against disabled 
persons, and concluded that Congress acted within its 
Section 5 power when it prohibited state government 
disparate impact discrimination and required state 
government employers to reasonably accommodate disabled 
employees and applicants for employment. Justice Breyer . 
wrote, "The Court suggests that the Act's 'reasonable 
accommodation' requirement and disparate-impact. standard 
'far exceed what is constitutionally required.' But we. have 
upheld disparate impact standards in contexts )Where they 
were not 'constitutionally required."264 
Where does Garrett leave disabled persons who are 
discriminated against by their state government employers, or 
prospective employers? First, Garrett blocks federal court 
ADA Title I actions by private individuals only if the state is 
the employer. Garrett does not block suit "against a municipal 
corporation or other governmental entity which is not an arm 
of the State."265 Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity 
"bars suits against States but not lesser entities."266 Second, 
although federal court ADA Title I actions seeking money 
damages may not be brought against states by private 
individuals, the Justice Department may bring ADA Title I 
enforcement actions.267 Third, private individuals may seek 
other selection criteria . , . is shown to be job-related for the position in question and 
is consistent with business, necessity . ... " Id.§ 12112 (b}(6). 
262. The ADA defines "discriminate" to include "not making reasonable 
accommodations to the known physical or mental limitations of an otherwise 
qualified individual with a disability who is an applicant or employee, unless such 
covered entity can demonstrate that the accommodation would impose an undue 
hardship on the operation of the business of such covered entity(.]" Id. § 
12112(b)(5)(A). 
263. 531 U.S. at 372. 
264. Id. at 385 {citations omitted) (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
265. Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 756 (1999). 
266. Id. 
267. For enforcement purposes, Title I of the ADA borrows the "powers, remedies, 
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prospective injunctive relief under the doctrine of Ex parte 
Young,2'' under which a state official may be subjected to a 
personal action in federal court requiring that he or she 
comply with the Constitution or a federal statute. 
Fourth, an individual may bring an action in state court 
under an applicable state statute that prohibits employment 
discrimination by the state on the basis of disability. Fifth, 
private individuals may bring ADA Title I actions against a 
state that has consented to suit. For example, Minnesota 
recently waived its Eleventh Amendment immunity from suit 
under the ADA and other federal employment statutes.
269 
Sixth, Congress could require states to waive Eleventh 
Amendment immunity from suit under the ADA as a 
precondition to receipt of federal funds. A bill now is pending 
before the U. S. Senate that would require states to waive 
Eleventh Amendment immunity from ADEA actions as a pre-
condition to receipt of federal funds.'70 The constitutionality 
and procedures" set forth in Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. 42 U.S.C. § 
12117(a) (1994). Title VII gives authority to the Attorney General to bring actions 
against "a government, government agency, or political subdivision." Id. § 2000e-
5(f){l). The Eleventh Amendment does not bar federal court actions against a state 
brought by the federal government. 
268. 209 U.S. 123 (1908). 
269. Minnesota Responds to Garrett Decision, Other States Consider Waiving 
Irrununiiy to ADA Lawsuits, 167 LAB. REL. REP. {BNA), June 25, 2001, at 233. 
270. On May 22, 2001, Senator Jeffords introduced Senate Bill 928, which 
provides for a limited waiver by state_s of their sovereign immunity from suit under 
the ADEA. 147 Cong. Rec. S5441-0l, S5458 (2001). The bill is co-sponsored by 
Senators Kennedy and Feingold, and provides as follows, in Sections 7 and 8: 
(7) The Supreme Court has upheld Congress' authority to condition 
receipt of Federal financial assistance on acceptance by the States or other 
recipients of conditions regarding or related to the use of that assistance, as 
in Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677 (1979). The Court has 
further recognized that Congress may require a State, as a condition of 
receipt of Federal financial assistance, to waive the State's sovereign 
immunity to suits for a violation of Federal law, as in College Savings Bank 
v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Education Expense Board, 527 U.S. 666 
(1999). In the wake of the Kimel decision, in order to assure compliance 
with, and to provide effective remedies for violations of, the Age 
Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 in State programs or activities 
receiving or using Federal financial assistance, and in order to ensure that 
Federal financial assistance does not subsidize or facilitate violations of the 
Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, it is necessary to require 
such a waiver as a condition of receipt or use of that assistance. 
(8) A State's receipt or use of Federal financial assistance in any program 
or activity of a State will constitute a limited waiver of sovereign immunity 
under Section 7(g) of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (as 
added by section 4 of this Act). The waiver will not ellminate a State's 
immunity with respect to programs or activities that do not receive or use 
Federal financial assistance. The State will waive sovereign immunity only 
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of this exercise of power by the Congress, under its taxing 
and spending power, is beyond the scope of this article. 
How extensive is the harm done to disabled persons by 
Garrett? Garrett focused on Title I's prohibition of em-
ployment discrimination. But there are other forms of 
discrimination by states that are of great importance to 
disabled persons. Some of these are covered by Title II of the 
ADA. which provides that "no qualified individual with a 
disability shall, by reason of such disability, be excluded from 
participation in or be denied the benefits of the services, 
programs, or activities of a public entity, or be subjected to 
discrimination by any such entity."211 A "public entity" is 
defined to include "any State or local government."
212 
Title II 
thus provides vitally important protections for disabled 
persons in the areas of public education, public 
transportation, public housing, access to public buildings, 
access to services and programs generally available to the 
public, freedom from physical barriers to voting, access to 
public recreation sites, and a myriad of other areas in which 
state discrimination against disabled persons, or state failure 
to accommodate their needs, blocks full inclusion of disabled 
persons in those aspects of daily life their fellow citizens take 
for granted. Title II of the ADA thus directly seeks to achieve 
the congressional purpose of "[invoking] the sweep of 
congressional authority, including the power to enforce the 
fourteenth amendment and to regulate commerce, in order to 
address the major areas of discrimination faced day-to-day by 
people with disabilities."273 
Chief Justice Rehnquist began his opinion in Garrett by 
limiting the scope of the opinion to Title I of the ADA. He 
wrote: "We decide here whether employees of the State of 
with respect to suits under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 
1967 brought by employees within the programs or activities that receive or 
use that assistance. With regard to those programs or activities that are 
covered by the waiver, the State employees will be accorded only the same 
remedies that are accorded to other covered employees under the Age 
Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967." 
Id. at *55459. On September 3, 2001, Senate Bill 928 was favorably acted upon and 
reported to the Senate by the Senate Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions 
Committee. 
271. 42 u.s.c. § 12132 (1994). 
272. Id.§ 1213l(l)(A). 
273. Id.§ 1210l(b)(4) (ADA Findings and Purpose). 
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Alabarria may recover money darriages by reason of the 
State's failure to comply with the provisions of Title I of the 
Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990."274 Focusing on a 
possible claim that Title II, like Title I, might encompass a 
prohibition against employment discrimination, the Chief 
Justice wrote the following: 
Respondents' complaints in the United States District Court 
alleged violations of both Title I and Title II of the 
ADA ... [N]o par1y has briefed the question whether. Title II 
of the ADA. dealing with the "services, programs, or 
activities of a public entity". . . is available for claims of 
employment discrimination when Title I of the ADA 
expressly deals with the subject .... We are not disposed 
to decide the constitutional issue whether Title II, which 
has somewhat different remedial provisions from Title I, is 
appropriate legislation under § 5 of the Fourteenth 
Amendment when the parties have not favored us with 
briefing on the statutory question. 275 
The majority opinion emphasized that the congressional 
record, including the House and Senate Committee Reports, 
focused on state discrimination in "public accommodations, 
public services, transportation, and telecommunications."276 
Similarly, the Appendix to the dissenting opinion of Justice 
Breyer, listing state by state "[s]ubmissions made by 
individuals to the Task Force on Rights and Empowerment of 
Americans . with Disabilities,"2". focused almost entirely on 
non-employment areas of state discrimination and state 
failure to reasonably accommodate. These areas of 
discrimination are covered by Title II, not Title I, of the ADA. 
. Therefore, the congressional record that the majority deemed 
inadequate to support Congress' exercise of Section 5 power 
when it. enacted Title I of the ADA may be adequate to 
convince at least one member of the Garrett majority that 
Congress properly exercised its Section 5 power when it 
enacted Title II of the ADA. 
Garrett dealt only with Title 
preclude federal court actions 
challenging conduct by states 
274. 531 U.S. at 360. 
275. Id. at 360 n. l. 
I actions and does not 
by private individuals 
that violates Title II. 
276. Id. at 371-72 (quoting S. Rep. No. 101-116, at 6 (1989); H.R. Rep. No. 101-
485, pt. 2, at 28 (1990)). 
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Unfortunately for victims of Title II violations, remedies 
available under Title II may not be as extensive as remedies 
that are available under Title I. The ADA incorporates the 
remedial provisions of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 
for violations of Title I, whereas the remedial provisions of 
Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
278 
are used for 
violations of Title II of the ADA.
279 
B. Buckhannon Board and Care Home, Inc. v. West Virginia 
Department of Health and Human Resources 
Many disability actions brought under Title II seeking 
declaratory and injunctive relief will be undermined by the 
Court's recent decision in Buckhannon Board and Care Home, 
Inc. v. West Virginia Department of Health and Human 
Resources,280 involving awards of attorney's fees under the 
ADA and other civil rights.statutes. Buckhannon arose when 
a state fire marshal ordered that an assisted living residence 
be closed because some of the disabled residents were unable 
to vacate the premises without assistance in the event of 
fire. 281 The group home brought an action under Title II of the 
ADA and the Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988 
(FHAA),282 on behalf of itself, similarly situated group homes, 
and group home residents. While discovery was progressing, 
the West Virginia Legislature enacted legislation that 
eliminated the statutory requirement that led to the order by 
the state fire marshal. The plaintiffs then sought attorney's 
fees as a "prevailing party" under the FHAA and ADA. The 
FHAA provides that "the court, in its discretion, may allow 
the prevailing party . . . a reasonable attorney's fee and 
costs."283 The ADA provides that "the court .. ., in its 
discretion, may allow the prevailing party . . . a reasonable 
278. 42 u.s.c. § 2oood (1994). 
279. For a discussion of Title II remedy issues, see Cheryl L. Anderson, Damages 
for Intentional Discrimination by Public Entities under Title II of the Americans with 
Disabilities Act: A Rose by Any Other Name, But Are the Remedies the Same?, 9 BYU 
J. PuB. L. 235 (1995); Leonard J. Augustine, Jr., Disabling the Relationship Between 
Intentional Discrimination and Compensatory Damages under Title II of the Americans 
with Disabilities Act, 66 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 592 (1998). 
280. 532 U.S. 598 (2001). 
281. Id. at 601. 
282. 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3631 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998). 
283. 42 U.S.C. §3613(c)(2) (1994). 
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attorney's fee, including litigation expenses, and costs .... "
284 
The plaintiffs relied upon the catalyst theory, under 
which "a plaintiff is a 'prevailing party' if it achieves the 
desired result because the lawsuit brought about a voluntary 
change in the defendant's conduct."285 The decision by Chief 
Justice Rehnquist, joined by Justices Kennedy, O'Connor, 
Scalia, and Thomas, rejected the catalyst theory. Rather 
than focusing upon the intent of Congress in enacting the 
attorney's fees provisions of the ADA, FHAA. and other civil 
rights statutes - most notably the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees 
Awards Act of 1976286 - the Court placed primary reliance on 
the Black's Law Dictionary definition of "prevailing party" as a 
"party in whose favor a judgment is rendered .... "287 The 
Court criticized the catalyst theory because it "allows an 
award where there is no judicially sanctioned change in the 
legal relationship of the parties."288 The Court concluded: 
A defendant's voluntary change in conduct, although 
perhaps accomplishing what the plaintiff sought to achieve 
by the lawsuit, lacks the necessary judicial imprimatur on 
the change. Our precedents thus counsel against holding 
that the term "prevailing party" authorizes an award of 
attorney's fees without a corresJ'onding alteration in the 
legal relationship of the parties. 
26 
Justice Ginsburg, in a dissent joined by Justices Breyer, 
Souter, and Stevens, harshly qiticized the majority opinion, 
in part because of its break with established lower court 
precedent. Her opinion noted: 
Prior to 1994, every Federal Court of Appeals (except the 
Federal Circuit, which had not addressed the issue) 
concluded that plaintiffs in situations like Buckhannon's 
and Pierce's could obtain a fee award if their suit acted as a 
"catalyst" for the change they sought, even if they did not 
obtain a judgment or consent decree. The Courts of 
Appeals found it "clear that a party may be considered to 
have prevailed even when the legal action stops short of 
final. . . judgment due to intervening mootness." 
Interpreting the term "prevailing party" in "a practical 
sense" . . . federal courts across the country held that a 
284. Id. §12205. 
285. 532 U.S. at 601. 
286. 42 u.s.c. § 1988 (1994). 
287. 532 U.S. at 602 (quoting BLACK'S !AW DIC110NARY 1145 (7th ed. 1999)). 
288. Id. at 606. 
289. Id. 
2001] 
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party "prevails" for fee-shifting purposes when "its ends are 
accomplished as a result of the litigation."
290 
The dissenters criticized the Court's decision because it 
"allows a defendant to escape a statutory obligation to pay a 
plaintiffs counsel fees, even though the suit's merit led the 
defendant to abandon the fray, to switch rather than fight on, 
to accord plaintiff sooner rather than later the principal 
redress sought in the complaint.'"91 The dissenters concluded 
that "the Court's constricted definition of 'prevailing party,' 
and consequent rejection of the 'catalyst theory,' impede 
access to court for the less well-heeled, and shrink the 
incentive Congress created for the enforcement of federal law 
by private attorneys general."
292 
Buckhannon's impact on ADA Title I employment 
discrimination actions will be limited because most of these 
actions seek money damages, and a pre-trial settlement 
normally will provide funds for attorney's fees, either as part 
of the settlement agreement or through · the retainer 
agreement between the attorney and client. However, as 
discussed above, Buckhannon will have a significant impact 
on Title II actions. It also will have an impact on many 
actions brought under Title III of the ADA
293 
alleging disability 
discrimination, or failure to reasonably accommodate, by 
private sector places of public accommodation. Title Ill 
covers entities such as hotels, motels, restaurants, 
entertainment facilities, amusement parks, retail stores, 
health care providers, and law firms. For Title Ill violations, 
the ADA incorporates the remedial provisions of Title II of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964,294 which limits the remedy to "pre-
ventive relief."295 Under Buckhannon, voluntary compliance 
with Title III on the eve of trial (compelled by the pending 
litigation) may block an award of attorney's fees to plaintiffs 
290. Id. at 625-26 (citations omitted}. 
291. Id. at 622. 
292. Id. at 622-23. 
293. 42 u.s.c. §12181 (1994). 
294. Id. § 2000a. 295. Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits public accommodation 
discrimination based on race, color, religion, or national origin. The Title II remedial 
provision provides that "a civil action for preventive relief, including an application 
for a permanent or temporary injunction, restraining order, or other order, may be 
instituted by the person aggrteved . ... " Id.§ 2000a-3(a}. 
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who sought declaratory and injunctive relief from public 
accommodations discrimination that affects large numbers of 
disabled persons. The Garrett decision blocking, on Eleventh 
Amendment grounds, private actions against states under 
Title I for employment discrimination, and the Buckhannon 
decision, eliminating the catalyst theory for attorney's fees 
awards in law suits seeking declaratory and injunctive relief 
in ADA and other civil rights actions, deliver a devastating 
double blow to disabled persons and their advocates. 
V. EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION DEVELOPMENTS 
A. Pollard v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Company 
The Supreme Court upheld well established circuit court 
Title VII precedent in two October 2000 Term cases, Pollard v. 
E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co.296 and Clark County School 
District v. Breeden. 297 Pollard concerned front pay awards in 
Title VII actions, and Clark County involved retaliation 
discrimination because of opposition to practices made 
unlawful by Title VII and participation in proceedings under 
Title VII. 
In Pollard, the unanimous decision written by Justice 
Thomas298 supported the Title VII front pay remedy in two 
ways. First, 'it confirmed the appropriateness of front pay as a 
remedy in general. Second, it held that front pay as a remedy 
is not subject to the dollar amount limitations ("caps") 
established by the Civil Rights Act of 1991299 for 
compensatory and punitive damages under Title VIL ' 00 
296. 121 S. Ct. 1946 (2001). 
297. 121 S. Ct. 1508 (2001). 
298. Justice O'Connor did not participate. 
299. 42 U.S.C. §§ 198l(a)(l) & (2) (1994). 
300. 42 U.S.C. §198la(b)(3) (1994) provides, In relevant part: 
Limitations - The sum of the amount of compensatory damages awarded 
under this section for future pecuniary losses, emotional pain, suffering, 
inconvenience, mental anguish, loss of enjoyment of life, and other 
nonpecuniary losses, and the amount of punitive damages awarded under 
this section, shall not exceed, for each complaining party- {A) in the case of 
a respondent who has more than 14 and fewer than 101 employees in each 
of 20 or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding calendar year, 
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Sharon Pollard worked as an operator in the hydrogen 
peroxide area of a DuPont plant in Tennessee. She was the 
victim of severe co-worker sexual harassment. which caused 
serious emotional harm and led to her need for short term 
disability leave. The harassment included sabotage of her 
work through false alarms. and the use by her principal 
harasser of the terms "bitches," "cunts," and "heifers" to 
describe women.301 The triggering event that caused Pollard 
to take disability leave was an incident in which a male co-
worker placed "a Bible on her desk, opened to a passage 
which read, 'I do not permit a woman to teach or have 
authority over a man. She must be silent. "'
302 
In her testimony, Pollard described her "nightmares, fear 
of crowds, nausea, anxiety, and sleeplessness."
303 
She was 
examined by a psychologist and a psychiatrist, each of whom 
testified at trial that "she suffered from post-traumatic stress 
disorder. 11304 
DuPont's liabilty for the co-worker sexual harassment 
was established by evidence of a "pervasively hostile 
environment [that] unreasonably interfered with [Pollard's] 
work performance,"305 and by evidence that Pollard's super-
visors repeatedly were informed of the co-worker harassment 
and took no meaningful corrective action. Steve Carney, a 
control room operator who was primarily responsible for the 
harassment, "never received a formal written reprimand, was 
never suspended from his job, and was never transferred to 
another shift, demoted, or terminated."
306 
When Pollard discussed her return from disability leave 
with DuPont management, she was told that they "would not 
guarantee that [she] would not be put back on a shift with 
than 201 employees in each of 20 or more calendar weeks in the current or 
preceding calendar year, $100,000: {C) in the case of a respondent who has 
more than 200 and fewer than 501 employees in each of 20 or more calendar 
weeks in the current or preceding calendar year, $200,000; and (D) in the 
case of a respondent who has more than 500 employees in each of 20 or 
more calendar weeks in the current or preceding calendar year, $300,000. 
301. Pollard v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours, Inc., 16-F.Supp. 2d 913, 915 (W.D. Tenn. 
1998). affd. 213 F.3d 933 (6th Cir. 2000), reu'd, 121 S. Ct. 1946 (2001). 
302. Id. at 914. 
303. Id. at 923. 
304. Id 
305. Id. at 922. 
306. Id. at 924. 
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Carney."'0 ' Pollard was terminated when she said that "she 
could not return to work under those conditions."
308 
These compelling facts led to the district court's remedy 
dilemma. The court concluded that compensatory damages 
for emotional pain and suffering, front pay, and punitive 
damages were appropriate given the egregious nature of the 
co-worker sexual harassment and inadequate management 
response. As the court expressed it, "This situation was 
reprehensible. This is a case of wretched indifference to an 
employee who was slowly drowning in an environment that 
was completely unacceptable, while her employer sat by and 
watched."309 However, the district court was bound by the 
Sixth Circuit decision in Hudson v. Reno,"0 in which a three 
judge panel held that front pay is a form of compensatory 
damages available to plaintiffs for intentional discrimination 
under the Civil Rights Act of 1991, and thus is subject to the 
caps on compensatory damages set forth in the Act. The 
district court discussed the insufficiency of the $300,000 of 
compensatory damages, which included front pay, awarded to 
Pollard: 
The Court notes. that the $300,000 award is, in fact, 
insufficient to compensate plaintiff for the psychological 
damage, pain, and humiliation she has suffered, in addition 
to the·loss of a lucrative career and secure retirement. The 
Court is bound by the statutory cap set forth in §198la 
however, and carmot award plaintiff compensatory damages 
in eiccess of that cap. 
Because the amount of compensatory damages awarded by 
the Court is $300,000, the Court is thus prohibited by the 
statutory cap from awarding plaintiff any punitive 
damages .... For the record, however, the Court finds that 
punitive damages are justified in this case, as defendant 
has "engaged in a discriminatory practice with malice or 
with reckless indifference to the federally protected rights of 
an aggrieved individual ... and, absent the statutory cap, 
the Court would have awarded punitive damages based 
upon DuPont's repeated failure to remedy this egregious 
situation. 311 
307. Id. at 921. 
308. Id. 
309. Id. at 924. 
310. 130 F.3d 1193 (6th Cir. 1997). 
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On appeal the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals panel 
expressed its disagreement with Hudson v. Reno, but 
concluded: [O]ur hands are tied. One panel of this court may not 
overturn the decision of another panel of this court - that 
may only be accomplished through an en bane 
consideration of the argument. Plaintiff does not purport to 
distinguish Hudson. Therefore, we must decline to 
overturn the district court's decision that front pay is 
included in the com2ensatory damages statutory cap found 
in 42 U.S.C. §198la.312 
The Supreme Court took the approach of all circuits 
other than the Sixth. and concluded that front pay .in Title VII 
cases is not subject to the caps set forth in the Civil Rights 
Act of 1991. The Court began with a discussion of Section 
706(gl of Title VII, as amended in 1972, which authorizes a 
court to "order such affirmative action as may be appropriate, 
which may include, but is not limited to, reinstatement or 
hiring of employees, with or without back pay . . . or any 
other equitable relief' as the court deems appropriate."
313
Lower federal courts rely upon this section in granting front 
pay in lieu of reinstatement in situations where reinstatement 
would be inequitable, because of harmful impact on third 
parties or for other reasons, or where reinstatement is not 
feasible or desirable because of a breakdown in the 
relationship between the plaintiff employee and the defendant 
employer. As the Supreme Court put it, "By 1991, virtually 
all of the courts of appeals had recognized that 'front pay' was 
a remedy authorized by §706(gJ. In fact, no court of appeals 
appears to have ever held to the contrary."
314 
Turning to the text of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, the 
Court noted that the phrase "compensatory damages" is not 
defined in the Act."' and that. "[i]n the abstract, front pay 
could be considered compensation for 'future pecuniary 
losses' in which case it would be subject to the statutory 
cap."316 The Court then stated that "we must not analyze one 
312. Pollard v. E.L DuPont de Nemours Co., 213 F.3d 933, 945 (6th Cir. 2000), 
rev'd 121 S. Ct. 1946 (2001). 
313. 42 U.S.C. §2000e-5(g)(l) (1994). 
314. 121 S. Ct. at 1950-51. 
315. Id. at 1951. 
316. Id. 
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term of §198la in isolation,"317 and concluded: "When §l98la 
is read as a whole, the better interpretation is that front pay 
is not within the meaning of compensatory damages in 
§198la(b)(3), and thus front pay is excluded from the 
statutory cap."318 
The Court acknowledged that Congress intended to create 
additional remedies for Title VII plaintiffs, whereas applying 
caps to front pay would reduce the available remedy.'
19 
The 
Court quoted §198l(a)(l) which provides, in relevant part, 
that "the complaining party may recover compensatory and 
punitive damages ... in addition to any relief authorized by 
section 706(g) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 .... "'
20 
The 
Court then confirmed the prevailing view of the courts of 
appeals that Section 706(g) does, in fact, permit the award of 
front pay, in lieu of reinstatement, and held, "Because front 
pay is a remedy authorized under §706(g), Congress did not 
limit the availability of such awards in §198la. Instead, 
Congress sought to expand the available remedies by 
permitting the recovery of compensatory and punitive 
damages in addition to previously available remedies, such as 
front pay."321 
The ·Court's decision in Pollard is consistent with 
congressional intent'22 and avoids many problems. For 
example, federal courts grant reinstatement in Title VII 
317. Id. 
0 318. Id. 
319. The Court wrote: Congress -expressly found that "additional remedies under Federal law are 
needed to deter unlawful harassment and intentional discrimination in the 
workplace," without giving any indication that it wished to curtail previously 
available remedies. Congress therefore made clear through the plain 
language of the statute that the remedies newly authorized under §198la 
were in addition to the relief authorized by §706(g). 
Id. (citation omitted). 
320. Id. 
321. Id. at 1952. 322. Senator Kennedy spoke on the floor of the Senate concerning the final 
version of the bill that became the Civil Rights Act of 1991, as follows: 
"Compensatory damages do not include backpay, interest on backpay, or any other 
type o[f} relief authorized under Section 706{g) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 
including front pay." 137 Cong. Rec. Sl5233-02, Sl5234 (1991). Similarly, the 
Interpretive Memorandum placed in the Congressional Record by Senator Danforth 
and other Republican senators stated that "limitations . . . placed on damages ... 
under Section 1981A ... cannot include backpay, the interest thereon, frontpay, or 
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termination cases if reinstatement is feasible and equitable, 
but often conclude that front pay in lieu of reinstatement is a 
more equitable remedy. If caps were placed on front pay 
awards, the result in many cases would be for courts to order 
reinstatement to preserve plaintiffs' ability to be made whole 
with other forms of compens.atory damages. This would 
happen even though front pay otherwise would be a more 
appropriate remedy than reinstatement, either because it 
would avoid unnecessary workplace disruption, or because it 
would avoid hardship for an employee who, like Sharon 
Pollard, would be returning to a poisoned and hostile 
workplace. 323 Caps on front pay awards would undermine judicial 
efficiency. The possibility that a jury might award front pay 
would force a federal judge to decide if the equitable remedy 
of reinstatement should be used rather than front pay, and 
the judge would neecl to make this determination, at the 
latest, before all of . the evidence is presented and before 
closing arguments.324 Caps on front pay awards also would 
motivate some employers to continue in their unlawful 
practices once they realize that the fmancial exposure they 
faced had reached the applicable cap, a cap that includes the 
front pay and compensatory and punitive damages they may 
have to pay. 325 
The decision by the Court in Pollard reflects the intent of 
Congress, when it enacted the Civil Rights Act of 1991, to 
provide additional remedies for victims of intentional 
employment discrimination. The decision also preserves front 
pay as a means for making whole victims of employment 
discrimination and for motivating employers to comply 
voluntarily with Title VII. 
B. Clark County Sclwol District v. Breeden 
The Court's per curiam decision in Clark County Sclwol 
District v. Breeden326 reversed an unpublished Ninth Circuit 
323. Pollard, Brief for the Petitioner, No. 00-763, 121 S. Ct. 1946. 2000 U.S. Briefs 
(Lexis) 763 at '38-49. 
324. Id 
325. Id. at '45. 
326. 121 S. Ct. 1508 (2001). 
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panel decision in favor of the plaintiff in a Title VII action 
alleging retaliation because of opposition to practices made 
unlawful by Title VII and because of participation in 
proceedings under Title VII.327 The district court had granted 
the defendant's motion for summary judgment. The court of 
appeals reversed and remanded for further proceedings at the 
trial level. Shirley Breeden worked as an administrator in the 
Human Resources Division of the Clark County School 
District. Her duties included review of job applications and 
related materials. The incident that gave rise to her law suit 
occurred at a staff meeting she attended with her supervisor, 
Don Eldfrick, and her subordinate, Jim Mcintosh. The three 
administrators reviewed a psychological evaluation report 
which stated that a job applicant once said to a co-worker, "I 
hear making love to you is like malting love to the Grand 
Canyon."328 Eldfrick looked at Breeden and said, "I don't 
know what that means."329 Mcintosh responded, "Well, I'll tell 
you later,"330 and both men "chuckled."
331 
Breeden was offended by the comments and laughter of 
the two men. Later in the day, she complained to Eldfrick 
and to his supervisor, George Ann Rice. In her subsequent 
judicial complaint, Breeden alleged that she suffered 
retaliation from Eldfrick because of the complaints, in the 
form of hostile treatment on the job. 
Breeden 'filed charges with the Nevada Equal Rights 
Corpmission and the EEOC, received a notice of right to sue 
from the EEOC, and filed an action in federal court. Breeden 
alleged that she suffered retaliation, in the form of a transfer, 
because of.her judicial complaint. After it became clear that 
327. Section 704(a} of Title VII provides: It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to discriminate against 
any of his employees or applicants for employment .. , because he has opposed any 
practice made an unlawful employment practice by this title. or because he has 
made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation, 
proceeding, or hearing under this subchapter. 
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3 (1994). The first and second parts of Section 704(a) are known, 
respectively, as the opposition clause and participation clause. 
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Rice decided to transfer Breeden before the complaint was 
filed and served on the school district, and before Rice knew 
about the law suit, Breeden alleged that the transfer was 
made in response to the school district's receipt of its copy of 
the notice of right to sue. 
This second allegation related to her participation in 
proceedings under Title VII. Charging parties are protected 
from retaliation if they can prove a causal link between their 
participation and an adverse employment action. In the view 
of the circuit court panel, Breeden "raised a genuine issue of 
material fact and has alleged sufficient facts to survive 
summary judgment."332 The court of appeals reviewed the 
record and found a possible "causal link"
333 
between 
participation activity and the transfer because: 
Rice's discussion about transferring Breeden occurred 
approximately three months after the EEOC's right-to-sue 
letter was sent to both parties, and her final decision to 
reassign Breeden occurred less than one month after she 
learned of the suit, both of which events are sufficiently 
proximate in time to raise a genuine issue of fact as to 
causation. 334 
By the time the case reached the. Supreme Court, Breeden 
was relying only upon a causal connection between the notice 
of right to sue and the transfer decision. The Court reviewed 
the record and disagreed with the court of appeals concerning 
the causation significance of the employer's receipt of 
Breeden's notice of right to sue. The Court viewed the facts 
as follows: 
The Ninth Circuit's opinion . . . suggests that the letter 
provided petitioner with its first notice of respondent's 
charge before the EEOC, and hence allowed the inference 
that the transfer proposal made three months later was 
petitioner's reaction to the charge. This will not do. First, 
there is no indication that Rice even knew about the right-
to-sue letter when she proposed transferring respondent. 
And second, if one presumes she knew about it, one must 
also presume that she (or her predecessor) knew almost two 
years earlier about the protected action (filing of the EEOC 
332. Breeden v. Clark County School Distriet, 232 F.3d 893 (9th Cir. 2000) 
(unpublished table decision}, available at 2000 WL 991821,·at **3. 
333. Id. 334. Id. (citing Nidds v. Schindler Elevator Corp .. 113 F.3d 912, 919 (9th Cir. 
1997) (holding that four months provides sufficient proximity to establish a causal 
link)). 
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complaint) that the letter supposedly disclosed . . . . The 
cases that accept mere temporal proximity between an 
employer's knowledge of protected activity and an adverse 
employment action as sufficient evidence of causality to 
establish a prima facie case uniformly hold that the 
temporal proximity must be "very close," .... Action taken 
(as here) 20 months later suggests, by itself, no causality at 
all.335 
Tue Court's presumption that the decision-maker Rice 
knew about the filing of the EEOC charge "almost two years 
earlier," and the Court's apparent conclusion that the 
transfer decision thus would have been motivated by the 
earlier charge filing and not the more recent receipt by the 
employer of the notice of right to sue, led the Court to a 
different conclusion from that of the court of appeals 
concerning the causation link between protected activity and 
the transfer decision. That is, the court of appeals focused 
upon a three month time period, beginning with receipt by 
the employer of the notice of right to sue, whereas the 
Supreme Court focused upon a twenty month time period, 
beginning with notice to the employer of the initial EEOC 
charge. With respect to proof of causation through focus 
upon the amount of time between the decision-maker's first 
having knowledge of the relevant protected activity and the 
transfer decision, there is a genuine issue of material fact 
that should have been decided"by a jury, and one wonders 
why the ~upreme Court wandered into the domain of the jury 
on this issue. 
The Court's discussion of the opposition claim does seem 
to have doctrinal significance. Tue Ninth Circuit, consistent 
with all other circuits, concluded there need not be an actual 
violation of Title VII for opposition to be protected. Instead, in 
the view of the Ninth Circuit, Breeden must have had a 
"reasonable, good faith belief'336 that Title VII was violated. 
The Supreme Court adopted this approach, without 
adopting the specific language used by the Ninth Circuit. It 
wrote: 
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has applied § 
2000e-3(a) to protect employee "oppos[ition]" not just to 
practices that are actually "made ... unlawful" by Title VII, 
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but also practices tbat tbe employee could reasonably 
believe were unlawful .... We have no occasion to rule on 
the propriety of tbis interpretation, because even assuming 
it is correct, no one could reasonably believe tbat tbe 
incident recounted above violated Title VII. 337 
449 
Circuit court of appeals opinions in all but the Sixth 
Circuit, and district court opinions in the Sixth Circuit, have 
considered what the Title VII legal test should be for 
opposition retaliation. They unanimously have concluded 
that an actual violation of Title VII is not required, but that 
the plaintiff must believe that a violation has occurred, and 
this belief must be a reasonable one under the 
circumstances. Some circuits describe this requirement 
through use of the phrase "reasonable belief,"338 while other 
circuits describe the same requirement through combined 
use of the phrases "good faith," and "reasonable belief."339 
Despite the difference in phraseology, all circuits are 
describing a similar requirement of subjective belief combined 
with objective reasonable belief that Title VII has been 
violated. 
The Court's opinion in Breeden seemingly establishes 
that the Supreme Court accepts the unanimous view of the 
Circuit Courts of Appeals that actionable opposition 
retaliation does not require an actual violation of Title VII, but 
does require that the plaintiff believe Title VII has been 
violated and that a reasonable person, under the same 
circumstances, would believe that Title VII has been violated. 
The Court's endorsement of this lower court doctrine was not 
stated directly, but would seem to be implicit in the Court's 
rejection of Breeden's claim because "no one could reasonably 
337. 121 S. Ct. at 1509 (citations omitted). 
338. See, e.g., Little v. Windermere Relocation, Inc., 265 F.3d 903, 913 (9th Cir. 
2001): Hamner v. St. Vincent Hosp., 224 F.3d 701, 705 (7th Cir. 2000); EEOC v. 
HBE Corp., 135 F.3d 543, 551 (8th Cir. 1998); Childress v. City of Richmond, 120 
F.3d 476, 482 (4th Cir. 1997); Wyatt v. City of Boston, 35 F.3d 13, 15 (1st Cir. 1994); 
Drinkwater v. Union Carbide Corp., 904 F.2d 853, 865 (3d Cir. 1990); Payne v. 
McLemore's Wholesale & Retail Stores, 654 F.2d 1130, 1140 {5th Cir. 1981}. The 
phrase "reasonable belief' is used in a Sixth Circuit district court opinion. Crockwell 
v. Blackmon-Mooring Steamatic, Inc., 627 F.Supp. 800, 807 n.5 {W.D. Tenn. 1985). 
339. See, e.g., McMenemy v. City of Rochester, 241 F.3d 279, 283 {2d Cir. 2001); 
Clover v. Total Sys. Servs., Inc., 176 F.3d 1346, 1351 (11th Cir. 1999); Parker v. 
Baltimore and Ohio RR, 652 F.2d 1012, 1020 (D.C. Cir. 1981). The phrase "good 
faith, reasonable belief' is used in a Sixth Circuit district court case. Miller v. Rudd, 
2001WL242588, at '15 (S.D. Ohio 2001). 
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believe that the incident recounted above violated Title VII."
340 
The Court more clearly articulated an objective standard 
when it wrote, "No reasonable person could have believed that 
the single incident recounted above violated Title VII's 
standard. 11341 
Breeden may present an example of the type of incident 
that would be subjectively offensive to some people, but that 
falls so short of the mark for actionable sexual harassment 
that a reasonable person would not conclude that Title VII 
has been violated. As the Court held in Meritor Savings Bank, 
FSB v. Vinson,342 "For sexual harassment to be actionable, it 
must be sufficiently severe or pervasive 'to alter the 
conditions of [the victim's] employment and create an abusive 
working environment."'343 Regardless of the extent, or unfair-
ness, of retaliation suffered by an employee because of his or 
her opposition to an employer's practice, the employee is 
protected by Section 704(a) only if the practice opposed 
violates Title VII or the employee has a reasonable belief that 
it violates Title VII. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
On balance, the October 2000 Term of the Supreme 
Court significantly undermined protections provided to 
employees by employment discrimination statutes. Circuit 
City p,ermits employers to force employees to waive their 
rights to a judicial forum for vindication of federal and state 
statutory rights, and Garrett eliminates the ADA as a 
meaningful source of protection for state employees from 
disability discrimination by state government employers. The 
October 2000 Term's erosion of the rights of employees is 
part of a more general pattern in which five members of the 
court, Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Kennedy, 
O'Connor, Thomas and Scalia, have joined together to tilt the 
scales against employees in cases before the Court. 
340. 121 S. Ct. at 1509. 
341. Id. at 1510. 
342. 477 U.S. 57 (1986). 
343. Id. at 67 (quoting Rogers v. EEOC, 454 F.2d 234, 238 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. 
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Therefore, the outcome in many employment cases in the 
future will be determined by Justices Kennedy and O'Connor, 
as they join either Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices 
Scalia and Thomas in undermining employee rights, or 
Justices Breyer, Ginsburg, Souter and Stevens in supporting 
the rights of employees in the workplace. 
